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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London sparked
nationwide outrage. The American public was shocked to learn that the Fifth
Amendment’s Taking Clause could be interpreted to allow the government to seize
a non-blighted residence and convey it to another private party to help facilitate a
development project. Yet, contrary to popular belief, the Kelo decision did not
mark a significant departure from the Court’s early eminent domain jurisprudence.
This article traces the judicial history of the Public Use Clause and the police
power of the states, and demonstrates the Court’s historical inability to clearly
distinguish between these concepts. This conceptual imprecision has led to a
deeply flawed and unpredictable takings jurisprudence and the erosion of
individual rights. Moreover, the author demonstrates that returning the legal
constructs of public use and the police power to their original narrow bounds
cannot, in itself, restore a consistent and principled Fifth Amendment takings
jurisprudence. Rather, a multi-tiered takings test is proposed, which would allow
for greater flexibility and precision in balancing the public interest against
protections of constitutional rights than is possible under a jurisprudence focusing
on notions of the police power and public use.
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Introduction
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London2 has
excited considerable debate, confusion and anxiety among American judges, scholars, politicians
and property owners. Following the Court’s holding that a municipality can use the eminent
domain power to condemn non-blighted residential property for an urban renewal project, many
Americans have reacted with varying degrees of shock, disillusionment and anger over what they
perceive is an attack on their—heretofore sacrosanct—property rights.3 However, while the
public is correct to view Kelo with deep apprehension, this case does not represent a significant
departure from the Supreme Court’s early eminent domain jurisprudence. Rather, Kelo
represents only the most recent and most publicized of a long series of decisions in which the
Supreme Court has obscured the distinctions between governmental powers4 and restraints5 and,
thus, eroded the Constitutional safeguards on private property.6
This article argues that the intellectual uncertainty surrounding eminent domain or
“takings” jurisprudence has led to the erosion of 5th Amendment protections of private property.
Specifically, this article examines the two concepts at the core of takings jurisprudence: 1) the 5th

2

Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
William Hoffman, Supreme Court Decision Sets More Property Fights, PACIFIC REPORTER, Jul.
15, 2005 (stating that readers were concerned that “the ruling could make it costlier, financially
and politically, to develop logistics facilities”); Lynne Jeter, Eminent domain ruling from
SCOTUS stuns developers: many are leery of the private property rights implications,
MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS JOURNAL, Aug. 8, 2005, at S6-7 (stating that the “news [of Kelo] sent
ripple effects throughout real estate and land development circles”).
4
Specifically the amorphous “Police Power”
5
Specifically the 5th Amendment’s restriction on Government appropriations of private land, or
“takings”.
6
See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954);
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984);
3
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Amendment’s Public Use Clause7 and 2) the “police power” of individual states. This article
argues that the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate principled boundaries between these two
concepts has deprived courts of the intellectual framework necessary for precise analysis of the
conflicting principles and interests involved in takings jurisprudence, leaving courts and
legislatures without a meaningful limiting principle for government takings. This results in
haphazard and poorly justified court holdings, ad hoc judicial review and, ultimately, diminished
property rights for private citizens. Sadly, the lack of an intellectual framework also has obscured
possible solutions to the takings dilemma by denying critics an effective rubric for articulating
alternatives to the Supreme Court’s approach. As a result, proponents of greater private property
protections find themselves either without a coherent alternative paradigm for advancing their
interests or advocating a paradigm that actually derogates from these rights.8
There already is a great wealth of legal scholarship critiquing the incoherence of 20th
Century takings cases and suggesting different tests or theories for restoring order to this area of
law.9 Some scholars have suggested that state-level legislation is the best method for striking a
balance between private rights and public needs.10 Others advocate abandoning the Court’s
current expansive interpretations of the police power and the Public Use Clause in favor of a
more restrictive or conservative understanding. However, despite the volumes that have been

7

Scholars sometimes refer to this as the “Takings Clause” or “Compensation Clause” depending
on what facet they desire to emphasize.
8
See discussion of the Strict “Public Use” argument infra.
9
See generally, Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. Land Use & Envt'l. L. 1 (2003);
Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making it Up—“Original Intent” and Federal Takings
Jurisprudence, 35 Urb. Law. 203 (2003).
10
See, e.g., Alan T. Ackerman, Condemnation Case of the Year: County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
45 ALI-ALR COURSE OF STUDY 269, 364-65 (2005) (discussing the embodiment of eminent
domain in state legislation); Frank A. Vickory & Barry A. Diskin, Advances in Private Property
Protection Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 561, 605 (1997) (discussing state legislation that creates
property rights that go beyond the Constitutional guarantees).
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written on takings jurisprudence and near-universal agreement that this subject is convoluted,11
there is almost no published literature directly addressing the question of why takings law
became so muddled to begin with. Is the current confusion attributable to sloppy application of
precedent by 20th Century Supreme Court Justices, or is the problem more fundamental?
Answering this question is an essential precondition to rebuilding the takings rubric into a tool
capable of yielding consistent court holdings that are both logically defensible and capable of
balancing private rights against public needs. As such, the “why” question is the focus of this
article.
This article asserts that the current incoherence of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence is
not a recent development but dates back to the 1830s. It further argues that the internal logic of
takings analysis had become unviable much earlier than most scholars have imagined and that
the process of deterioration actually was complete by the end of the 19th Century.12
This analytic deterioration can be traced to three specifically-identifiable causes that are
largely overlooked by mainstream takings scholarship. These are 1) the fact that the concept of a
state police power first emerged in disputes over the division of state and national power, i.e.
federalism, 2) the temptation to expand the scope of the Public Use Clause to encompass
government takings for public needs beyond simple use by the public and 3) the fact that the
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William P. Barr et al., The Gild That is Killing the Lily: How Confusion Over Regulatory
Takings Doctrine is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 429, 484 n.242 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37
(1964)) (stating that “the predominant characteristic of [takings] law is a welter of confusing and
apparently incompatible results”). I do not suggest that all scholars reach the same conclusions
about the direction that takings jurisprudence should take. My point is only that most scholars
begin with the premise that this area of law is confusing.
12
Many scholars begin their analysis with the 1887 case, Mugler v Kansas. This article argues
that Mugler merely brought the latent imprecision of earlier takings cases to the fore. Thus,
Mugler is better viewed as an analytic endpoint in understanding the tangled web of takings
jurisprudence.
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Public Use Clause and the police power evolved from two separate bodies of Supreme Court
precedent, which did not begin to converge until the 14th Amendment was passed in 1866 and
the process of “Incorporation” began.13
By analyzing the specific causes of takings jurisprudence deterioration outlined above,
this article identifies three driving mechanisms for liberalizing takings law, all of which
developed before the end of the 19th Century and all of which are present in the major eminent
domain holdings of the 20th Century. A comparison of these mechanisms and their causes to the
alternative theories advanced by the advocates of increased private property protection
demonstrates that the incoherence of takings jurisprudence is a fundamental problem inuring in
the current takings discourse and that proponents of increasing private property protections must
establish a new analytical framework for takings jurisprudence before they can effect meaningful
change.
Methodology
This analysis is divided into seven sections. Section 1 traces the Supreme Court’s
increasingly expansive interpretation of the Public Use Clause from the early “Mill Act” through
the 1850s when the Supreme Court began “incorporating” the various provision of the Bill of
Rights against the states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
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Incorporation is the process by which the states adopted the Bill of Rights through the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. According to the conventional wisdom, the Takings
Clause was not officially incorporated until1897 with the case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See ERWIN CHERMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 478-79 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the times
when the various provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated against the states). However,
the Supreme Court began using the language and logic of eminent domain analysis in state
takings cases far earlier in the century. See Section 4 infra. This article emphasizes the
underlying logic of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence in the 19th Century and does not view
the Court’s disclaimer of its analysis as a bar to discussion.
5

Section 2 outlines the development of the “police power” beginning with Chief Justice
John Marshall’s first articulation of the concept in 1827 through the Incorporation Era. Section 2
demonstrates how the Supreme Court increasingly broadened the application of the police power
while retaining its narrow theoretical underpinnings in the common law of nuisance.
Sections 3 and 4 analyze how forcibly conjoining the police power and Public Use Clause
through Incorporation transformed the latent imprecision in each line of cases into points of
tension in the new combined takings analysis. Section 5 then briefly addresses several prominent
takings cases from the latter half of the 20th Century and demonstrates that the Court’s failure to
address these points of tension when they first emerged in the mid-19th Century directly caused
the three mechanisms of liberalization that muddle takings jurisprudence in the 21st Century.
The final three sections argue that the dichotomous police power/public use analytic
framework which underlies the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence cannot be applied in a consistent
and principled manner even by restoring these terms to their original narrow ideations, as
conservative judges and scholars advocate. Section 6 examines the arguments of two of the most
prominent conservative critics of the Supreme Court’s expansive reading of the Public Use
Clause, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and Professor Richard Epstein14 and
demonstrates how their proposed formulations of takings jurisprudence ineluctably succumb to
the same theoretical and practical flaws as the approach embraced by the Kelo majority. Section
6 argues that these failings stem from the fact that Kelo’s critics challenge only the modern
application of takings jurisprudence rather than its flawed theoretical predicates.

Professor Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Faculty
Director for Curriculum and the Director of the Law and Economics Program at the University
of Chicago School of Law. See http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/epstein (containing further
biographical information) (last accessed December 20, 2005).
14
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This article concludes that the courts must abandon the flawed police power/Public Use
dichotomy in favor of a more nuanced analytical framework and proposes a multi-tiered
jurisprudential test based on the new framework, which allows for greater flexibility and
precision than is possible under any reformulation of the current takings model.

Section 1-“Round Holes:” The Early Evolution of the “Public Use” Clause
Though both the police power and the Public Use Clause inform takings jurisprudence,
only the latter finds direct expression in the text of the Constitution.15 Specifically, the 5th
Amendment states “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”16 The exact meaning of this pithy injunction is the subject of great scholarly
debate, especially in the wake of the Kelo decision.17 However, the contours of what constitutes
a “public use” have never been clear, even in the earliest days of the Constitution.18
Commenting on the Supreme Court’s haphazard use of the term “public use” in Kelo,
Justice Sandra Day O’Conner stated that the Supreme Court’s application of the “public use”
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The term “Police Power,” is not mentioned once in the Constitution. However, if one takes the
argument that the police power is coterminous with a state’s sovereignty to its logical
conclusion, then it is possible to argue that the 10th Amendment, which states that “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people” enshrines this principle. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.
16
U.S. CONST. Amend. V (emphasis supplied).
17
See, e.g., Norm Pattis, Not Public Use, But Necessity That Should Drive Land Takings,
CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE, Jul. 25, 2005 (calling the Kelo decision “a grotesque perversion of
the very rights and liberties we celebrate”); Robert Solomon, Court Took Proper Tack In Kelo
Case, CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE, July 25, 2005 (praising “[t]he virtue of Kelo”); Jerry Stouk,
Unfinished edifice lex, NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL, Jul. 25, 2005 (calling Kelo a “high water
mark” for eminent domain).
18
See, e.g., Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (stating “The question what
constitutes a public use has been before the courts of many of the states, and their decisions have
not been harmonious”).
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requirement “wash[ed] out the distinction between private and public uses of property—and
thereby effectively…delete[s] the words “for public use” from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”19 Without this clause, O’Conner further stated that “[n]othing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any
farm with factory.”20 As a result, O’Conner concluded that “the specter of condemnation [now]
hangs over all property.”21
Justice O’Conner’s now famous statements aptly capture many Americans’ belief that the
Supreme Court has destroyed the “public use” requirement. However, while Kelo may have
many negative effects on the application, or non-application, of the Public Use Clause, it is
doubtful that this decision will further erode the logical integrity of the clause. This is because
the Public Use Clause had become unviable long before the Kelo decision. Writing in 1985,
Professor Epstein commented that “[t]o judge from the cases and scholarship on the subject, this
chapter [on public use] largely deals with an empty question.”22 Indeed, as early as 1949, a
published comment in the Yale Law Journal concluded that “so far as the federal courts are
concerned, neither state legislatures nor Congress need be concerned about the public use test or
any of its ramifications.”23 Given this long-standing doubt among scholars as to whether the
“public use” functions as a significant limitation on takings, it is necessary to ask whether this
constitutional phrase ever has held meaning and, if so, what that meaning was.
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Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O’Conner, J., dissenting).
Id.
21
Id.
22
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN,
161 (Harv. Univ. Press 1985).
23
Note, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599,
613-614 (1949).
20
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Some of the earliest Supreme Court cases construing the Public Use Clause involve state
statutes allowing a landowner to dam a waterway, and thereby flood upstream land in order to
build a water-powered mill. These “Mill Acts”24 required the owner to pay compensation to the
owners of the flooded land, sometimes in excess of 150% of that land’s value.25 Further, the
mills were available to all members of the public for processing their grain, albeit it at a fee.26
Because these mills were so important to, and would be used by, the public at large, the Supreme
Court in Burlington Township v. Beasley had little difficulty holding that the use was just as
public as a highway or railroad:
It would require great nicety of reasoning to give a definition of the expression ‘internal
improvement’27 which…would show that the means of transportation were more valuable
to the people of Kansas than the means of obtaining bread. It would be a poor consolation
to the people of this town to give them the power of going in and out of the town upon a
railroad, while they were refused the means of grinding their wheat.28
That mills which the every citizen can use are “public uses” within the meaning of the 5th
Amendment is too obvious to require further elaboration. Indeed, Justice Thomas cites these in
his Kelo dissent as the paragon of public uses, even while advocating for a narrow interpretation
of the phrase.29 However, while the Beasley Court’s holding clearly was consistent with the
Public Use Clause, the Court’s rationale for the holding was highly problematic.
The Beasley Court actually advanced two rationales for upholding the constitutionality of
this Mill Act. The most obvious rationale was that mills were like roads because they were
24

Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681.
Epstein, supra note 15, at 174 (citing New Hampshire Mill Act)
26
Township of Burlington v. Beasley, 94 US 310, 313 (1876).
27
‘Internal improvement’ was the language used by a Kansas statute to describe projects built on
land condemned using eminent domain and which were required by law to be open to all
members of the public, such as highways, railroads, canals and government buildings. Id. Thus,
the term is merely a synonym for “public use” even under the term’s strictest construction.
28
Id. at 313-314.
29
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25
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publicly accessible. However, a brief examination of the above passage reveals that the court,
perhaps unintentionally, also grounded its holding on the fact that the mills were necessary for
the public to have a “means of grinding their wheat.”30 This public necessity argument is wholly
irrelevant to the 5th Amendment question of whether the mills actually were used by the public.
Having concluded that the condemnations were for a “public use,” the Beasley Court need not—
and should not—have continued its inquiry. Moreover, it is not even clear whether the public use
rationale or the public necessity rationale was the driving force behind the holding. This
unfortunate dictum marks the beginning of the Public Use Clause’s intellectual deterioration.
Nine years after Beasley, the Supreme Court addressed another mill act in Head v.
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.31 The act under consideration in Head was a so-called “General
Mill Act,” which authorized property owners to use the eminent domain power to build mills for
private uses such as manufacture. In holding this mill act constitutional, the Head Court blandly
remarked that various lower courts had upheld these condemnations for private enterprise “by
reason of the advantages inuring to the public from the improvement of water power and the
promotion of manufactures”32 and that such judicial practice was “confirmed by long usage or
prior decisions.”33 The court then proceeded to string cite prior state and lower federal court
precedent without comment.
The Head decision should have refocused the public use inquiry. Instead, the Head Court
chose to raise the public use question explicitly, comment on its breadth, and then duck the
question entirely:

30

Beasley, 94 US at 314.
113 U.S. 9 (1885).
32
Id. at 19.
33
Id.
31
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The question whether the erection and maintenance of mills for manufacturing purposes
under a general mill act…can be upheld as a taking, by delegation of the right of eminent
domain, of private property for public use, in the constitutional sense, is so important and
far reaching, that it does not become this court to express an opinion upon it, when not
required for the determination of the rights of the parties before it. We prefer to rest the
decision of this case upon the ground that such a statute, considered as regulating the
manner in which the rights of proprietors of lands adjacent to a stream may be asserted
and enjoyed, with a due regard to the interests of all, and to the public good, is within the
constitutional power of the legislature.34
Commentators such as Epstein have been quick to point out that the Head Court utterly
fails to provide “an explanation of how the confrontation with the Public Use Clause can be
avoided.”35 The Court clearly states the property was taken under the power of eminent domain
and even discussed possible rationales for including these kinds of ‘public necessity’ takings
within the ‘public use’ rubric. In light of these statements, the court’s assertion that “the
question…is so important and far reaching, that it does not become this court to express an
opinion upon it” borders on the comic. However, as forceful as these criticisms are, they fail to
capture the full extent of the violence that the Head Court did to public use jurisprudence.
The U.S. Supreme Court could have avoided a direct conflict with the Public Use Clause
by categorizing the Mill Act Cases as a constitutional oddity justified by history, court precedent
and little else. While such an approach would not have been wholly intellectually satisfying, it
would have allowed the Court to reach the same result while confining the damage done to the
Public Use Clause to one rarified subset of cases. Scholars and courts trying to read coherence
back into the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence have favored this approach.36 Indeed, when the
Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with the same facts sixteen years before Head, the Court
took this more honest approach, stating that:

34

Id. at 20-21.
Epstein, supra note 15, at 171.
36
See, e.g., Kelo 125 S. Ct. at 2681(Thomas, J., dissenting).
35
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It is difficult to reconcile these statutes, upon principle, with the constitutional rights of
the citizen. The property in such cases is not taken into possession and use by the public
in its corporate capacity to be devoted to some purpose supposed to be for the general
good; nor (unless the mills when established are to be deemed public mills…) do[es]
the…public derive any direct use, profit, or convenience from them…37
Once the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged this obvious constitutional reality, it went on
to note that
the incidental benefit to the public from turning to use all the power in running streams
may be very great, and that, such is the nature of property in and along these streams, the
power cannot be made fully available without such a law as that we are considering38
Ultimately the court chose the socially useful—rather than the constitutionally
defensible—result. However, the court was careful to note that its result was informed more by
the overwhelming weight of precedent than by any attempt at a coherent takings analysis.39
Regardless of the merits of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding, it is at least clear
what factors informed its decision. Future courts attempting to apply Miller’s reasoning would
not be greatly confused by a judicial attempt to force the round peg of “public benefit” into the
square hole of “public use.” The same cannot be said in Head. By stating that “public use” is so
broad that it can encompass private uses with incidental public benefits and yet so narrow that it
is not implicated by a government-sanctioned taking of land for private enterprise, the Head
court interprets the Public Use Clause out of existence. Indeed, because the breadth of the
exception is so much greater than the narrow rule, the Head court’s holding actually has the
dramatic effect of transmogrifying the public use restraint into an affirmative grant of power for

37

See, e.g., Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn 365, 366 (Minn. 1869).
Id. (quoting Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (Conn. 1866)).
39
Id. at 366-67 (stating, “Had not similar laws, in states having constitutional restraints similar to
ours, been uniformly sustained by the courts, we should hesitate long before upholding this one.
The decisions, however, are so numerous, and by courts of so great authority, that we are
constrained to hold the law to be constitutional”).
38
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government takings that incidentally benefit the public. This result would not have occurred if
the court either ignored the public use requirement or stretched it to encompass public benefits.
However, by deviating from the Constitution in both ways, the Supreme Court was left with little
choice but to concoct an inscrutable—and not surprisingly unnamed—governmental power
possessing the precise dimensions of the void left by the public use restraint.
Based on the above cases, it is clear that by the mid-1880s the Supreme Court’s precedent
had evolved in such a way that a judge could uphold almost any taking by employing one of
three rationales: (1) the taking conferred an incidental benefit on the public and, therefore, was a
public use; (2) the taking did not implicate the Public Use Clause but, rather, some mysterious
legislative power that acted as an affirmative grant in precisely the same situations where a
“public use” requirement would appear to impose a restriction; or (3) that takings jurisprudence
had become so convoluted that it was incapable of yielding principled results. Thus, courts
should simply dispense with the public use analysis altogether and defer to the legislature’s
judgment as to whether the taking was valid or not. The three rationales will be termed engines
of liberalization because they provide easy grounds for judges to expand the scope of the Public
Use Clause in almost any conceivable situation.
The damage to the Public Use Clause that many people assume was done in Kelo actually
was complete after the Supreme Court decided Head in 1885. All of the confusion evident in
cases such as Mugler, Mahon, Midkiff, Berman and Kelo can be traced to logical extensions of
one or more of the three engines of liberalization mentioned supra. Sections 3 and 4 will
demonstrate how the Supreme Court employed these engines in late-19th and 20th Century cases.
However, it is first necessary to examine the other major conceptual actor in takings
jurisprudence: the state police power.
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Section 2-“Square Pegs:” The Evolution of the Police Power from Gibbons to Miln
For most of the 18th Century, the Public Use Clause only bound the Federal
government.40 Because the federal government possessed only those powers specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, any action had to be rationalized in terms of one of those powers.
Though the Public Use Clause was a restraint on government power rather than a grant,
interpreting this clause broadly allowed the federal government to condemn land for anything
that could be deemed a “public use” even where such an action could not be justified as
“necessary and proper” for the advancement of another of an enumerated power, such as the
commerce power.
In contrast to the Federal government, the states retained plenary legislative power except
where they had explicitly delegated the power to the Federal government through the
Constitution. Prior to the incorporation of the Takings Clause, the only limitations on a state’s
power to condemn land were its own constitution and laws.41 This is significant because, until
the 14th Amendment was ratified, courts expounding on the various types of state power would
not need to consider any overlap with a federal public use restraint in their analyses. As a result,
the body of case law surrounding the police power developed in isolation from the public use
line of cases.
Unlike the public use limitation, the police power is not mentioned anywhere in the text
of the Constitution. Nor do any of the founding-era documents reference this power as such.

40

See James W. Ely, The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 333 (1999).
41
It should be noted that many states either expressly provided for compensation is certain cases
or provides this as a matter of state policy. However, this did not necessarily mean that the taken
property had to be for a “public use.”
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Rather, this power—at least insofar as it has a definitive legal meaning—is entirely of judicial
creation.
The first explicit reference to a “police power” comes from U.S. Supreme Court Justice
John Marshall’s opinion in Brown v. State of Maryland.42 In Brown, the Court was faced with
the question of whether a state lawfully could require foreign importers to obtain a license from
the state or whether this power had been ceded to the federal government through the
Constitution. Because Brown was an early federalism case, the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to discuss the various powers that states possessed vis-à-vis the federal government.
The court noted that:
The power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which
unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States…The removal or
destruction of infectious or unsound articles is, undoubtedly, an exercise of that power,
and forms an express exception to the prohibition we are considering. Indeed, the laws of
the United States expressly sanction the health laws of a State.43
In Gibbons v. Ogden, decided three years earlier, Justice Marshall stated that “the acknowledged
power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens, may
enable it to legislate on this subject (commerce) to a considerable extent.”44
Courts and commentators have not been able to reach a stable consensus as to the scope
of the police power. Some judges and commentators have held that this refers only to the states’
power to abate nuisances and protect against threats to the public health and safety.45 Under this
narrow view, the term “police power” is closely linked with the state’s common law powers to
42

25 U.S. 419, 431 (1827).
Id. at 443-444.
44
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 208 (1824).
45
See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991) (stating “[t]he States'
traditional police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and
morals”); Christopher Wolfe, Moving Beyond Rhetoric, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1065, 1075 (stating that
“traditional police powers... extend to the protection of public health, safety, welfare, and
morals”).
43
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abate nuisances.46 Others have interpreted the term to encompass the entire array of powers
remaining with the several states after they ratified the constitution.47 Under this view, the
“police power” is synonymous with the “residuary sovereignty” that James Madison described in
Federalist 6248 and is “coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.”49 Yet a third
perspective, introduced by the Supreme Court in the now-infamous Lochner opinion, attempts to
find a middle ground between these two extremes by characterizing the police power as
…certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State in the Union, somewhat
vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of which have not
been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated and without, at present, any
attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general
welfare of the public.50
Each of these views finds some support in the early case law that developed the term.51 However,
the overwhelming majority of modern scholars embrace the police power paradigm in which the
police power is equivalent to the state’s residual sovereignty.52
Notwithstanding legal scholars’ near-universal acceptance of the “police-power-equalsall-state-power” paradigm, this position is unsatisfactory in several important respects. First, to
the extent that police power is a mere synonym for state power, the term possesses almost no
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See, e.g., David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting
History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 497, 544 (asserting that “police power
regulations are valid if related to preserving or protecting the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare is rooted in the nuisance-suppression origins of police power”).
47
See, e.g., id. at 510 (discussing the perception of “‘police power’ being commonly equated
with powers of sovereignty, especially with respect to the states”); D. Benjamin Barros, The
Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 475 (2004).
48
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 320 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
2001) ("The equal vote allowed to each state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the
portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving that
residuary sovereignty."); See also Barros, supra note 37, at 475.
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analytical utility. Thus, justifying a state’s actions as a “lawful exercise of the police power”
merely substitutes conclusion for analysis and description. Read according to the majority view,
this quote means only that ‘the state’s action is lawful because it is lawful.’ There is good reason
to be suspicious of logic this circular or to believe that the Supreme Court coined a term for a
non-starter. A second reason to reject this rationale is that the fact that the text of the Brown v.
Maryland53 and Gibbons v. Ogden54 opinions strongly suggest that Justice Marshall meant the
term “police power” to connote something vastly more limited than the entire panoply of the
states’ “residual sovereignty.”
Proponents of the “residual sovereignty” view of the early police power often point to the
broader meaning that the word “police” held in the early 1800s as support for their position. One
example of this is D. Benjamin Barros’ recent article, The Police Power and the Takings
Clause.55 In this Article, Barros argues that
At the time, “police” had several meanings relating to government. The term was used
broadly to refer to civilization or civil organization, and “public police” meant the
equivalent of public policy. From these usages, the term “police” evolved to mean the
regulation and administration of the civil community’s laws and public order.56
This article does not quarrel with Mr. Barros’ proposition that the word “police” may have
included a wide range of meanings in the 1800s and that some of these were quite general.
However, the fact that this term could have a broad meaning in some circumstances does not
justify the assumption that Marshall intended this broad meaning to attach to the :police power.”
This is especially true where the earliest opinions using the term contain strong textual evidence
of a narrower meaning.
53
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Justice Marshall refers to the specific power that Maryland exercised in Brown as “the
power of the state to tax,”57 the “general power of taxation”58 and “the taxing power”59 at various
points in his opinion. At no point does Marshall state that this power is a subset of the police
power. Further, when speaking more broadly about state power as a whole, Marshall refers to
this body of “residual sovereignty” simply as “state power”60 and “powers which remain in the
States.”61 If Marshall intended the police power to encompass the totality of state sovereignty, it
is strange that he used these much broader terms in every reference to the full universe of state
power. In fact, Marshall did not use the term police power when talking about “state power” even
once in the opinion.
The fact the Marshall court intended the police power to refer only to laws relating to
public health and safety also is evident from Gibbons v. Ogden. There, Justice Marshall
explicitly acknowledged that other legal scholars had referred to police powers in terms broader
than his own: “this exclusive grant is a law regulating commerce; although, in some of the
discussions elsewhere, it had been called a law of police.”62 Nonetheless, Marshall took great
care to distinguish his police power from other types of governmental power:
With regard to the quarantine laws, and other regulations of police, respecting the public
health in the several States, they do not partake of the character of regulations of the
commerce of the United States.63
Thus, when Marshall refers to “[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its
domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens…”,64 it is clear that he intends this sentence to be
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read as a list of separate--though overlapping--categories of state power and that no one of these
listed powers encompasses both itself and the other two. Were this not the case, then this text
would be ludicrously redundant. Barros’ conclusions regarding the general usage of “police” in
the 18th Century may be valid as general propositions, however, they cannot be more probative
of what the Supreme Court intended the police power to mean than the Court’s own statements.
After Ogden and Brown, the fact that the police power is only a subset of “state power” is
at least reasonably clear from Marshall’s language. However, this clarity began to erode as early
as ten years after the Brown decision. In 1837, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of
whether a state could pass laws that affected interstate and international commerce in City of
New York v. Miln.65 In Miln, the court addressed a law passed by the City of New York that
required the masters of ships coming into the Port of New York to provide the authorities with
the names of all foreign passengers and which imposed large fines if foreign paupers were
brought into the country. Miln challenged this law as an attempt by a state to regulate interstate
commerce.66 The City claimed that it had the power to regulate paupers as a health and safety
law that fell within the state’s police powers.67 Writing for the court, Justice Barbour noted that
this case was governed by Justice Marshall’s earlier opinions in Ogden and Brown.68 Relying
heavily on these cases, Barbour stated that it was in “the general power of the states to regulate
their own internal police, and to take care that no detriment come to the commonwealth.”69
Barbour further opined that it is
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competent and as necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the
moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against
the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported,
or from a ship…70
By characterizing this law as “precautionary measure” to protect the state from moral and
physical hazards, Barbour brought the regulation in issue squarely within the ambit of the narrow
health and safety conception of the police power articulated by Justice Marshall in Ogden and
Brown. However, while the Miln court correctly captured the principle articulated in those
earlier cases, it confused some of their reasoning.
After characterizing the New York law as an exercise of the police power, Justice
Barbour went on to discuss the police power more generally. In this regard he stated:
That a state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and
things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not
surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this,
it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety,
happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and
every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends…That all those
powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more
properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained…71
This statement is significant because Barbour equates the state’s power “to advance the safety,
happiness and prosperity of [the] people” with an “internal police” power. This is a far broader
statement of the police power than Justice Marshall advanced only ten years earlier. To the
extent that all legislation is in some way related to “safety, happiness, prosperity…and general
welfare,” Barbour’s statement of the police power swallows the whole of a state’s “residual
sovereignty.” Significantly, the list of examples of this power that Barbour finds in prior court
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opinions all fall within the narrower conception of the police power as preventing harm to the
community from criminals and health hazards.72
That the Miln court significantly expands the conception of the police power is evident
from comparing Barbour’s statements with those made earlier by Justice Marshall. This,
however, is not the full extent of the harm. By equating the police power with state sovereignty
and then listing only examples of this power that relate to harm prevention it becomes unclear
whether Miln has expanded the police power to embrace all state powers, or shrunk state powers
to include only those of harm prevention. This would have had severe repercussions for the
federalist balance of power if Barbour’s language had not been entirely dicta.73 However,
Barbour’s equation of the police power with a state’s sovereignty provided the model that future
Supreme Court opinions would cite to and rely on.
The fact that the Miln court misunderstood Justice Marshall’s statement of the police
power’s function and limits should now be clear. This leaves the question of why the Miln court
became so greatly confused by Marshall’s articulation of the police power only ten years after
the term was coined. Existent legal scholarship has not addressed this question, however, this
article asserts that the Supreme Court’s confusion is attributable to the fact that the police power
first emerged in federalism cases.
The precise issue in Ogden and Brown was whether the state law in question was a law
rooted in the power to regulate interstate commerce—which the states had ceded to the Federal
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government and could no longer exercise —or some other type of power that the remained with
the state. To decide this constitutional issue, Ogden and Brown, thus, needed only to state
whether the law was one rooted in the commerce power or not. It was not necessary to the
Court’s reasoning to decide precisely what power the state was exercising so long as it was some
power other than commerce. By framing the state’s law as one primarily designed to promote
internal public health and safety, Justice Marshall effectively demonstrated that the law was not
primarily designed to a regulate interstate commerce. Read correctly, Ogden and Brown only
state that the police power is not the interstate commerce power. These cases do not suggest that
all state laws must be exercises of the police power; indeed, Marshall explicitly mentions a
separate taxation power remaining with the state.74 This distinction is subtle, but important.
The mistake that Miln makes is to treat Justice Marshall’s merely illustrative example of
a non-commerce-based state power as exhaustive. This is an easy mistake to make because in
Ogden and Brown the law in question so greatly affected commerce that it could only be
characterized as the product of a commerce or police power. However, the fact that only one of
two characterizations was possible in these two cases in no way meant that these were the only
two characterizations that could be used in all cases. Unfortunately, Miln missed this subtle
distinction and, as a result, deprived the term “police power” of its former ability to describe
anything more specific than state power. This error would have profound effects on later takings
jurisprudence.

Section 3- “Forcing the Round Peg Into The Square Hole:” The Convergence of the State
Police Power and the Public Use Clause
A. The Conservative Model of Public Use & Police Power Interplay
74

See, Brown, 25 U.S. at 441
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At first blush, one would not think that the Public Use Clause and the police power ever
would become entwined. In its narrowest conception, the Public Use Clause is implicated only
when the government takes land for public uses such as a road or courthouse. The police power,
in contrast, has its roots in the common law right of the state to prevent individuals from harming
other citizens or the public at large.75 The classic statement of this “anti-nuisance” conception76
is embraced by the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or “use your property so as
not to injure another’s.”77 Thus, when the state proscribes certain uses of property that do injure
others, it is not taking away a right that the property owner had to begin with. The state simply is
exercising the right of self-defense on behalf of other citizens. For this reason, the state has never
been required to compensate a land owner for value lost due to reasonable restrictions on land
use.
Because the wrongful conduct of a property owner is the touchstone of the common law
of nuisance, this logic only extends to private actions that have been declared “noxious.” Its
theory cannot extend to preventing uses of property which cause harm, but which are not
wrongful and has no sensible application to laws that force individual property owners to bear
the costs of government improvements for the entire community.
Once incorporated against the states, the “public use” clause falls on the opposite end of
the state power spectrum from the law of nuisance. Under the narrow conception of Public Use
75
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Clause, the state may exercise its power of eminent domain to take land for a “public use” only if
it compensates the property owner. The logical distinction between these two inquiries becomes
most clear by asking whose current or proposed usage the court is examining. Under a strict
“Public Use” analysis, the question of whether the government can exercise eminent domain is
focused entirely on what the state plans to do with the property after acquiring it. An antinuisance analysis, in contrast, focuses on what the private property owner did with the land prior
to the government action. Properly understood, these inquiries not only are separate but utterly
unrelated. This conservative model of the relationship between an “anti-nuisance police power”
and the Public Use Clause is best illustrated graphically.
Figure 1. Conservative Model of the Police Power and Public Use Clause
Preventing a Public Harm

Creating a Public Benefit

State Power Continuum
Preventing
Recognized
Nuisances

Taking for Public
Uses (ex
courthouse & roads)

In theory, “public uses” are only a narrow category of public benefit because there are
many ways in which the public at large can benefit from a property—e.g. providing tax revenue
to fund municipal services, providing aesthetic beauty, etc. Public nuisances, in
contradistinction, are only a small subset of private land uses that may harm neighbors or the
public at large or wrongfully withhold benefits. Many perfectly lawful purposes that courts
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would not be prepared to categorize as nuisances can cause annoyance or harm to the community
in the wrong circumstances. Between these two extreme sets of state actions, there is a vast
logical gulf that encompassing all other state legislation designed to create a public benefit or
prevent a public harm. Thus, under this rigid theoretical model, a police power analysis and a
public use analysis would never parallel one another, much less be confused.

B. The Interplay of Public Use and Police Power Concepts after Miln & Head
The theoretical model of state power described above is in accord with the most
conservative conceptions of the police power and the Public Use Clause. However, the Supreme
Court never has embraced such narrow definitions in its jurisprudence. When Justice Marshall
first coined the term “police power” in Brown, he grouped quarantine laws, restrictions on
imports, siting requirements for storage of dangerous materials like gunpowder, criminal laws
and other laws relating to public “health and safety” under the umbrella of the police power.
Criminal laws and regulations on siting and storage of explosive materials are easy to reconcile
with an anti-nuisance rationale.78 However, it strains the logic of nuisance too far to state that it
encompasses every possible regulation designed to ameliorate hazards to public “health and
safety.” Thus, the police power, as originally conceived by Justice Marshall, can most logically
be characterized as beginning with nuisances and covering all legislation aimed at harm
prevention. Graphically represented, this brings the scope of the police power to the dotted
middle line separating the prevention of public harm from conference of a public benefit. It does
not encompass those laws that seek to improve public welfare through affirmative state action.
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Notably, Epstein by requiring an actual “physical invasion,” apparently would not consider
this to be an act of nuisance abatement.
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Both judges and scholars have remarked that the line separating harm prevention from
benefit conference is often difficult to locate, because elements of both may be present in any
given case.79 Even Epstein acknowledges that “some uncertainty must be tolerated at the
fringes.” Nonetheless, acknowledging some “uncertainty at the edges” does not justify
destroying the distinction altogether. To state that an initiative to give educational scholarships to
all of its citizens is a law relating to “health and safety” is to stretch the term so far as to divorce
it from any meaning. The same could be said of an attempt to characterize an average middle
class home that complies with all fire, zoning and health codes as a nuisance because it
wrongfully deprives the state of the tax revenue that it would receive if a shopping mall was built
on that property.
By conflating the police power with the whole of state sovereignty, Miln extended the
scope of the police power up to the limits of state sovereignty.80 At the very least, the post-Miln
police power abuts the public use restriction. However, if the public use restriction is
simultaneously misread as an affirmative grant of government power, then “public use” becomes
just another subcategory of the police power. Displayed visually, Miln extended the scope of the
police power all the way to the right end of the state power spectrum shown above.
Had the Supreme Court done no more than conflate the police power with the state’s
sovereignty, then the Public Use Clause and the police power always would collide. However, by
extending the Public Use Clause to embrace all “public benefits,” the Supreme Court extended
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public use leftward on the state power spectrum at least as far as the benefit creation/harm
prevention dividing line. This is displayed graphically in figure 2
Figure 2: State Power after Miln and Head
Preventing a Public Harm

Creating a Public Benefit

State Power Continuum
Preventing
Recognized
Nuisances

Exclusive Police Power
Public Use & Police Power Overlap

Taking for Public
Uses (ex
courthouse & roads)

Figure 2 demonstrates that the collision of the police power and the takings clause is
indeed messy. By interpreting “public use” as “public benefit” and by interpreting “police
power” as “state sovereignty,” the police power and the public use restraint overlap whenever a
state government uses private property to create a public benefit. As a result, any exercise of
state power that falls to the right of the harm/benefit lines can be categorized either as an
exercise of the police power or of eminent domain with equal accuracy. The confusion that this
generates is obvious even to the casual observer. While the police power, through its common
law ancestry, implies that the state need not pay for what it takes, the Public Use Clause
specifically mandates compensation. However, the Head/Miln conception of state power
simultaneously precludes and requires compensation in many of the same cases. The confusion
that this framework creates should be distressingly evident. What is more perplexing, however, is
why this confusion was not foreseeable. The Supreme Court was broadening its conception of
the police power in Miln at almost the same time that it was expanding the scope of the Public
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Use Clause in Beasley. This begs the question of why the Court did not foresee that its two lines
of jurisprudence were on course for a messy collision. Why did the court decide Head without
accounting for the inevitable overlap that the new “public benefit” would have with its “policepower-as-all-state-power” line of jurisprudence? These questions have not been answered in any
published literature on takings jurisprudence. More alarmingly, these questions have not even
been asked. The oversight by legal scholars is unexplainable. However, the oversight by the
Court can be understood by reference to history.
Prior to 1866, the Bill of Rights, including the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment,
only applied to actions by the Federal government.81 In that year, the states ratified the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law…82
This Amendment began the process of “Incorporation” which, in time, applied most of the
substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights to the state governments through “Due Process.”
Before the passage of this amendment, the Takings Clause only applied to the federal
government. To the extent that states had not delegated their powers to Congress in the
Constitution, they retained plenary legislative power and were not bound by the Takings Clause.
As a corollary, the Federal government possessed only those powers delegated to it by the states
and did not have ‘residual sovereignty’ out of which a police power could be carved. Thus, when
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Justice Marshall first articulated the boundaries of the state police power in 1827, he could not
have foreseen its eventual merger with the federal public use restraint. Indeed, even as Justice
Barbour misapprehended Marshall’s limited state police power, both the Civil War and the 14th
Amendment remained on the distant horizon. Thus, no matter how broadly he crafted the police
power, Barbour could not have predicted its encroachment on the Court’s public use
jurisprudence. Viewed in this light, the imprecision of the Supreme Court’s early public use and
police power jurisprudence is far more understandable, even if no less unfortunate.
Section 4- “When the Pieces Don’t Fit, Pretend they Do:” The incoherence of PostIncorporation Takings Jurisprudence
Once the Takings Clause was incorporated against the states, any exercise of that
mysterious legislative power by a state would have to fall under the umbrella of the police power
along with everything else. Thus, by the 1880s, the police power had become one of the primary
engines of liberalization.
The increasing prominence of the police power as an engine of liberalization in takings
jurisprudence is problematic because the Supreme Court still associated the police power with its
anti nuisance origins even as it was expanding its conceptions of that power. Thus, any taking
that was justified as an exercise of the police power implicitly invoked anti-nuisance rationales
which did not require landowner compensation. The Public Use Clause, in contrast, required
that the taking be both for a “public use” and that it be compensated as necessary preconditions
for an exercise of eminent domain. Merging the police power into an eminent domain analysis
made contradiction inevitable. This, in turn, added further confusion to takings analyses and
increased the possibility that a judge would rely on the punting engine to escape from the takings
maze.
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Despite the obvious problems with this takings model, sections 1 and 2 demonstrate that
this is exactly the rubric that the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence compelled them to adopt
when attempting to reconcile the police power and the takings clause lines of jurisprudence postincorporation. This model, and the Supreme Court’s discomfort with it, is evident in the earlyProhibition era case of Mugler v. Kansas.83
In Mugler, the state of Kansas outlawed the manufacture of alcohol and statutorily
declared all building and items used for manufacture to be ‘nuisances” subject to confiscation or
destruction by the police.84 Mugler owned a brewery, which he operated lawfully prior to the
prohibition law.85 After the act was passed, Mugler continued to operate his brewery until the
police destroyed the building and all of the bottles, beakers and other materials inside of it.86
Mugler and the state advanced two very different conceptions of the police power before
the court. Citing a long chain of court holdings, Mugler stated that “a legislative enactment
cannot make that a nuisance which is not such in fact”87 and that
[s]uch a legislative determination would also be void, because, where the fact of injury to
public health or morals did not exist, as here, it would be a violation of the absolute right
of the citizen to follow such pursuit as he sees fit, provided it be not in fact 'injurious to
the community’.88
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Based on this reasoning, Mugler argued that his brewery was not a nuisance and that its
destruction deprived him of property as much as if the state had taken it for public use.89
Mugler further argued that, even if brewing could be deemed a nuisance, this only would give
the state the power to enjoin the activity, not to destroy the property.90 This argument was
consistent with the traditional nuisance law principle that “where a nuisance is to be abated, the
abatement must be limited by its necessities, and no wanton injury must be committed.”91
Further, Mugler advanced the novel argument that the state should be obligated to compensate
him for the loss of value even if he still retained possession of and title to the land.92 In support,
he cited Supreme Court precedent stating that actual use by the public is not required for a
taking.93
The arguments of the attorney for the State of Kansas are captured in the opinion of the
Kansas Supreme Court.94 In holding against Mugler, the Kansas Supreme Court articulated a
wide interpretation of the police power consonant with that adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Miln.95 After articulating this sweeping “public good” police power, the Kansas court noted
that, prior to the ratification of the 14th Amendment, the states always had the power to regulate
the use of private property and that all property rights were held subject to the police power of
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the state.96 The Kansas court then concluded that the 14th Amendment’s incorporation of the
Public Use Clause had not diminished this power through a rather compelling argument. First,
the Kansas court stated that the purpose of the 14th Amendment was to grant equality to the
former slaves and that the Amendment should be construed according to this goal.97 The Kansas
court then noted that the protection of brewery owners had little relevance to this purpose.98
Further, this court stated that “[n]either the real estate nor the personal property is ‘taken’ by the
state for public use. The state obtains no title, no easement, no license,—nothing. And the owner
is in no way deprived of his property.”99
Perhaps most convincingly, the Kansas court noted the practical consequences of
requiring state to pay landowners for any diminution in value to their property based on valid
exercises of the police power:
We will suppose the case of a new state where, either because no apparent necessity
existed, or from inadvertence or neglect, no statute was enacted against the keeping of
gambling houses…Must the state, as a condition precedent to the enforcement of
legislation against the evil be compelled to buy the houses, or their furniture and
gambling devices, together with the good-will of their business?... Think of the states
being compelled to buy up gambling houses, brothels, and lotteries…before any statute
for their suppression could be enforced!100
Based on the seemingly intolerable financial burden that compensation imposed on states, the
Kansas court concluded that if the framers of the 14th Amendment had intended “a construction
so degrading to the states, and so subversive to their authority, it is doubtful if it would have been
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ratified by a single member of the Union.”101 Thus, the Kansas court concluded that no
compensation was due to Mugler for his loss.
The arguments of Mugler and the Kansas Supreme Court have been elaborated at such
length for two reasons. First, each argument contains substantial logic and equity. It seems
unfair for a business owner to invest heavily in a factory or brewery and then have it destroyed a
few years later because the state legislature has outlawed his trade. In contrast, requiring the state
to compensate everyone who it wants to regulate would prove so burdensome as to be
unworkable. Second, despite the conflict between Mugler and the State of Kansas, each side
perfectly captures one of the strands of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. Mugler’s statement
that a taking can occur even when the land is not directly ‘used’ by the public is well supported
both by Beasley and Head. However, Kansas’ claim that the state police power encompasses all
legislation that furthers the “public good” is equally well supported by Miln.
Many scholars critical of contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence begin their
inquiries with Mugler, implying that, before this case, there was a golden age of takings
coherence.102 Indeed, Justice Thomas, in his Kelo dissent, specifically references Head and
earlier Mill Act cases as examples of the correct approach to takings. However, the fact that
neither Mugler nor Kansas is able to advance a broad definition of one concept without
embracing a narrow conception of the other forcefully demonstrates that the incoherence of
takings jurisprudence dates back far earlier than the Mugler opinion. The incorporation of the
Public Use Clause against the states only brought the latent imprecision of Supreme Court police
power and public use jurisprudence to the fore. The fact that this conflict was both very real and
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quite unexpected in the 19th century is apparent from an offhand but telling remark made by the
Kansas Supreme Court when hearing Mugler.
It is not a little remarkable that, while [the Public Use Clause] has been in the constitution
of the United States as a restraint upon the authority of the federal government for nearly
a century, and while during all that time the manner in which the powers of that
government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the
most rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon its power has rarely
been invoked in the judicial forum… But while it has been a part of the constitution as a
restraint upon the powers of the states only a few years, the dockets of this court are
crowded [with takings cases]…103
This statement illustrates the fact that the Public Use Clause and the police power interacted in
post-incorporation takings jurisprudence to create more confusion than either concept had
created when applied on its own. This strongly suggests two conclusions. First, and perhaps most
obviously, the Supreme Court did not consider the impact of its Public Use jurisprudence when
designing the police power or the police power when interpreting the Public Use Clause. Second,
the passage of the 14th Amendment was a potent catalyst for generating confusion in later takings
cases.
In Mugler, the Supreme Court could not ignore the glaring contradictions in its two lines
of takings jurisprudence or the fact that each party had significant support from precedent.
However, while the Court could not escape the need to redefine the borders of the Public Use
Clause and the police power, it could have used this opportunity to acknowledge the unintended
effects of incorporation on the logical coherence of takings jurisprudence and abandon the old
Public Use and/or police power mode of analysis in favor of something more workable. Because
no court could be expected to predict the Civil War and the ensuing changes in the federal
balance decades in advance, the prestige of the Supreme Court would not have been diminished
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by admitting that the old rubric was unworkable and by making fundamental changes.
Regrettably, the Court chose not to address the fundamental imprecision of its takings analysis
and, instead, simply shifted the positioning of the public use limitation and the police power on
the state power continuum. In so doing, the Court made several new errors that would further
confound takings jurisprudence.
The Mugler Court resolved the conflicting theories of the litigants by increasing the
scope of the police power while reducing that of the Public Use Clause. In so doing, the court
employed some highly suspect logic. First the Court noted that
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if, were it held that if the government
refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the use of the public, it can
destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any
extent…without making compensation because, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is
not taken for the public use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional
restriction…104
However, less than a paragraph after announcing this logical and seemingly equitable rule, the
Court stunningly announced that “these principles” have no application to the case under
consideration”105 because the state’s action was “exerted for the protection of the health, morals,
and safety of the people.”106 The Court then went on to state “all property is held subject to the
state’s police power”107 and that this power encompasses the state’s ability to
prescribe regulations to promote the peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of a state, develop its resources,
and add to its wealth and prosperity.108
According to the Mugler opinion, an act grounded in this broad police power “by the destruction
of property which is itself a nuisance…is very different from taking property for public use.”109
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Finally, the Court noted that a state can declare specific property uses to be nuisances through
“valid legislation.”
The Supreme Court’s ultimate holding that leveling the Mugler brewery and destroying
all of the objects in it was not an excessive abatement of the nuisance110 is not as disturbing as
the logic that the Court used to achieve this result. First, by stating that “all property is held
subject to the state’s police power” and then interpreting such power to include every possible
act of state legislation, the Supreme Court effectively subjects all private property rights to the
caprices of state legislatures. The only safeguard remaining on a person’s property is the flimsy
requirement that the law depriving them of such property be “valid.”
What is perhaps most alarming about Mugler is that the Court’s reaffirmation of the
police-power-as-all-state-power paradigm is accompanied by an intellectual retreat in the
justification for the police power.111 Mugler repeatedly reasserts the links between the police
power and its anti-nuisance origins. Through this device, the Court is able conclude that all
property is subject to the police power. This is an extremely significant statement, because it
implies that property ownership is conditional and that any valid state legislation depriving an
owner of his property extinguishes the owner’s rights in that property ipso facto. Rather than a
public use inquiry, this logic is a gross extension of anti-nuisance principles that effectively
precludes compensation even if the “police power” regulation takes property for such purposes
as developing natural resources or adding to the state’s “wealth and prosperity.”
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Legal scholars interpreting Mugler are quick to point out that this case unfolded during
the height of the prohibition movement and the Supreme Court’s holding that states can declare
any long-legalized property uses to be nuisances probably would not be extended beyond
prohibition cases.112 There undoubtedly is much truth in this position. However, this is not a
ground to dismiss the Mugler holding as an isolated historical accident. Regardless of what
moral and political views may have influenced the Court to find no taking in this case, the
Supreme Court reached its desired result by employing one of the same engines of liberalization
developed in earlier cases; namely holding that the taking does not implicate the Public Use
Clause but, rather, the state police power. The fact that the Supreme Court is unlikely to ever
again hold that a state may declare whole industries to be per se nuisances does not defeat the
fact that the Court used the same principles to achieve the desired result as it had in many past
cases.
The only significant innovation in the Mugler opinion is the expansion of the narrow
nuisance rationale to buttress all exercises of police power, even those to that fall all the way to
the right on the state power spectrum. It is possible that this decision was based on a genuine
belief that alcohol production truly was a nuisance. However, the Court’s forceful—yet
unsupported—assertion that “the present case must be governed by principles that do not involve
the power of eminent domain”113 also suggests a growing awareness by the Court that takings
law had grown distant from its historical justifications. Thus, if the Court was not willing to
reduce the scope of the police power and the public use limitation to reconnect these concepts

112

See, e.g., Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-first Amendment and State Control Over
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161, 169-70 (1991);
Kevin Wendell Swain, Note, Liquor By the Book in Kansas: The Ghost of Temperance Past, 35
WASHBURN L.J. 322, 342 (1996).
113
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added).
37

with their original justifications then some new rationale would have to be superimposed onto
the takings framework no matter how uneasy the fit.
Though the temperance movement ended almost a century ago, the engines of
liberalization developed in early case law to justify the holding of Mugler remain viable and
common today. Indeed, these engines are present in most of the major 20th Century takings cases
and the police power still retains its associations with anti-nuisance principles.

Section 5-“If Not Sensible, then Practical:” Takings Jurisprudence in Later 20th Century
Cases
A. Ordering the Chaos: Achieving Practical Results from an Incoherent Analysis
The specific techniques that the Supreme Court developed in the 19th Century are (1)
stating that the taking conferred an incidental benefit on the public and, therefore, was a public
use, (2) stating that the taking did not implicate the Public Use Clause but, rather, some
mysterious and extraordinarily flexible legislative power, or (3) arguing that takings
jurisprudence had become so convoluted and incapable of yielding principled results that ad hoc
review was justified.114
Stated tersely, these three engines respectively can be labeled as ‘stretching,’ ‘shrinking,’
and ‘punting.’ Using the stretching engine, the Supreme Court can find the public use test to be
satisfied by any public benefit. This allows takings, but still requires compensation. Using the
shrinking engine, the Court can find that the Public Use Clause only requires compensation when
property is taken for “public use” and that the government appropriation under consideration is
not for a public use and, thus, does not trigger the requirement to compensate. Because the
Public Use Clause is read out of existence, some other state power (the police power) must be
114
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present in these situations. The third engine can be used in those few cases where the taking is
not defensible using the first two engines. This third engine also can provide auxiliary support
for the other two and is named ‘punting’ because it begins with an acknowledgement that takings
jurisprudence is too convoluted to apply in a principled fashion. Based on this, the Court is
justified in deferring to legislative judgments about what is a valid “public use.” This third
engine is, perhaps, the most powerful because the less comprehensible or more suspect the
Court’s opinion, the stronger this rationale becomes.
The characterization of Supreme Court justifications for liberalizing takings
jurisprudence as “stretching,” “shrinking” and “punting” confessedly possesses an element of
cynicism. However, this does not imply that the Justices of the Supreme Court are acting with
dishonorable intentions or are intentionally distorting the takings law for activist purposes. In
fact, the reason these three justifications are labeled “engines” is because they tend to operate of
their own force even when the Court attempts to apply takings precedent to new situations in
good faith.
By the end of the 18th Century, the police power and the Public Use Clause had become
so entangled and contradictory that a court simply could not engage in a credible takings analysis
without redefining the boundaries of one concept or the other in individual cases. Thus, Justices
engaged in takings discourse simply could not avoid employing one engine or the other.
Similarly, because both a broad view of the police power and a broad view of the Public Use
Clause were well entrenched in Supreme Court precedent, the decision of where to set the
boundaries of the concepts in any given case could only be arbitrary or based on the Justices’
personal views of how the case should be decided. For this reason, even the most assiduous
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Justice would be tempted to dispense with the pretenses of engaging in a thorough takings
analysis in favor of deferring to the judgments of an elected body.
B. Stretching, Shrinking, and Punting in Modern Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Berman,
Midkiff, & Kelo
i. Berman
Many critics of 20th Century takings jurisprudence believe that the Supreme Court
substantially eviscerated the Public Use Requirement of the 5th Amendment in Berman v.
Parker.115 Here, the Supreme Court upheld a plan by Congress to use the eminent domain power
to acquire and revitalize large sections of a “blighted” or slum neighborhood in Washington DC,
in which area Congress exercises the plenary powers of a state government.116 One resident who
owned a parcel of land in this neighborhood protested the condemnation because his particular
property was not blighted.117 This resident claimed that the government’s proposal violated the
Public Use Clause because the condemned properties would be turned over to a private agency
for private development and whereas clearing unsanitary slums is necessary for the public health,
safety and welfare, developing a “better balanced, more attractive community” by condemning
non-blighted land is not a public use.118
The Berman Court found in favor of the Federal government largely through the punting
engine. First, the Court found that “an attempt to define [the police power’s] reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.”119 After invoking the futility of
engaging in takings analysis, the Court stated that “when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not the
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judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs.”120 The Court then noted that this rule applies
even where the government power in question is eminent domain.121
After articulating the principle of near-absolute deference to the legislature, the Berman
Court proceeded to make some of its most controversial statements. First, the Court noted that
“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear”122 and that Congress has substantial latitude to determine the amount of
land and the procedures for effectuating this end.123 Second, and perhaps most infamously, the
Court stated that “the rights of property owners are satisfied when they receive that just
compensation which the 5th Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.”124
Critics have noted that these statements read the public use requirement out of takings
jurisprudence.125 This view is supported both by the Court’s statements and by its refusal to
scrutinize the government’s means in any way. Indeed, the “statement that once the object is
within the authority of Congress…” strongly resembles a necessary and proper analysis. This is
inappropriate for two related reasons. First, the jurisprudential presumption that “no word [in the
Constitution] was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added”126 militates against reading the
“Public Use” clause as a mere duplication of the Necessary and Proper Clause,127 which already
prohibits the federal government from doing anything that does not advance one of its
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enumerated powers.128 For the “Public Use” Clause to have meaning separate from the
Necessary and Proper Clause it, therefore, must impose an additional restriction on government
power. This is buttressed by the fact that the phrase “nor shall…” in the Public Use Clause
connotes a restriction on government power and not an additional grant.129
Second, if the Public Use Clause is a restriction on government power, it cannot
accomplish its essential function when the task of determining when the restraint applies is
entrusted to the party to be restrained. This is asking the fox to guard the henhouse.
Scholars and judges have paid substantial attention to these shortcomings in the Berman
opinion. However, few of them have asked the more fundamental question of whether these
shortcomings actually altered the outcome of the analysis. This article asserts that they do not
for several reasons. First, by employing the punting engine, Berman followed the overwhelming
weight of precedent. While the Court’s statement that the 5th Amendment requires only
compensation for property taken may be unsatisfying from a theoretical perspective, it cannot
make any practical difference if the Court delegates the task of deciding what a public use is to
Congress. Because the “legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public
needs,”130 adjudicating the question of public use, even if done diligently, only serves to generate
dicta.
The second basis for concluding that Berman reflected no meaningful departure from
earlier takings jurisprudence is that even if the Berman Court had eschewed the punting engine,
it still would be forced to apply either the stretching engine or shrinking engine. Under the
Supreme Court’s broad police power and public use constructs, the Court would be required to
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decide whether the taking would be characterized as valid either under the police power or the
Public Use Clause. Thus, even if the Court decided to apply a public use analysis, the ultimate
question of what shape this analysis must take would remain arbitrary.
The third consideration in evaluating the consequences of the Berman Court’s blunder is
the most important but also the most overlooked. Because the primary variable in postincorporation takings jurisprudence is the determination of where to draw the boundary between
the police power and the Public Use Clause, the only two outcomes are that the taking would be
deemed a valid exercise of the police power or a legitimate taking.131 Even assuming that it had
been theoretically possible for the Court to choose one engine over the other in a non-arbitrary
fashion—which it could not have done—this still would not have affected the outcome of the
case. A broad reading of either the police power or the Public Use Clause would have allowed
the government to appropriate the land. The only question would be whether the government
must pay for this appropriation or not.132 Thus, regardless of whether Berman decided to employ
a public use analysis and regardless of which variant of the analysis they employed had they
chosen to do so, compensation invariably would be the only question ultimately in play under the
5th Amendment.
Based on these considerations, there is no reason to believe that Berman effected any
meaningful substantive change in the practical application of takings jurisprudence even if one
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were to accept the highly questionable proposition that that, by the time of Berman, it remained
possible to mangle takings theory any further. The only innovation of the Berman Court is the
discomfiting honesty with which it applied well-established precedent.
ii. Midkiff
The Supreme Court returned to the question of what government purposes justified an
exercise of eminent domain under the Public Use Clause in the 1984 case, Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff.133 In Midkiff, the Hawaii State Legislature determined that a significant
percentage of all private land was owned by a small number of citizens and that the vast majority
of Hawaiian citizens leased their land from this small group.134 The legislature further
determined that this extreme concentration of land ownership dated back to feudal landholding
system that was in place prior to Hawaii’s admission to the union and that the continued
existence of this pattern “was responsible for skewing the State's residential fee simple market,
inflating land prices, and injuring the public.”135
Because the private landowners feared the tax consequences of selling their land outright
and because most tenants were too poor to purchase it, the legislature created a redistribution
system that allowed tenant’s to request condemnation of their leased land and to purchase the fee
simple at a price determined by the state government. 136 The legislature further allowed tenants
to borrow up to 90% of the purchase price from the government.137 Shortly after this program
was instituted, several large landowners brought suit, claiming that the legislature’s explicit

133

467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 231.
135
Id. at 232.
136
Id.
137
Id.
134

44

intent to transfer land from one group of private landowners to another was not a “public use”
and that the state therefore lacked the power to use eminent domain.138
The Supreme Court upheld the program as a valid public use after finding that
“regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police
powers.”139 Writing for the majority, Justice O’Conner noted that Berman was the “starting
point” for an eminent domain analysis.140 O’Conner then repeated the Berman Court’s statement
that
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the
exercise of eminent domain is clear… [And that] the means of executing the project
[also] are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has
been established."141
This is the same punting engine employed in Berman and its consequences here are no different.
Once two questions of whether the government’s stated goal is a public use and whether the
eminent domain is the proper method of achieving this goal are ceded to the legislature, the
Court has few remaining grounds for overturning the taking. O’Conner acknowledges the almost
completely outcome-determinative effect of the punting engine through her statement that
There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what
constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with the police
power. But…it is "an extremely narrow" one.142
However, despite O’Conner’ extensive reliance on Berman, Midkiff evidences a somewhat
different—though by no means novel—formulation of the public use analysis. In Berman, the
Supreme Court noted that Congress’ actions were designed to rectify the unsafe and unsanitary
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environment of a “blighted area.”143 Though the Berman Court did not go so far as to hold that a
run-down neighborhood was a common law nuisance, it is clear that this problem falls within the
ambit of Justice Marshall’s “public health and safety” formulation of the police power. This is
significant because the Mugler-era takings cases tended to use the shrinking engine and
references to the police power to uphold such actions,144 whereas situations falling much farther
to the right on the state power continuum tended to require employment of the stretching engine
and a greater number of references to public use.
The issue in Midkiff is far more difficult to categorize than those in Berman, Mugler,
Miln and Head. The Hawaii state legislature does not, and could not, state that the landowners
are using their property in any way that harms the public. In fact, by leasing their land to others
who could not afford to purchase it outright, they arguably are conferring a benefit on the public.
However, this benefit is public only because so many people and properties are bound up in the
leasing arrangement. Unlike a property owner who, by building a mill on his land that provides
the benefit of needed agricultural processing for the community, the decision of one landowner
to lease his or her property to one tenant has relatively limited effects. This not only obscures the
line between preventing harm and conferring a benefit, but the line between public and private as
well. A final level of confusion is revealed by observing that there is nothing about the way the
physical property is used that is problematic. The public harm (or non-benefit) is solely a
function of who holds title.
The multiple levels of analytical ambivalence presented by Midkiff frustrated principled
application of a dichotomous (public use or police power) takings analysis because the Hawaii
legislature did not propose a public use for the condemned land nor did it stop any harmful uses.
143
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In all likelihood, the leased land would be used in exactly the same way after condemnation as
before. Thus, neither focusing on the conduct of the landowner nor the proposed use by the
government can yield helpful clues about whether this is justified under the police power or the
Public Use Clause.145 This forces the conclusion that the Hawaii legislature’s sole motivation for
the use of eminent domain was to effect the transfer of individual parcels of land from property
owner A to lessee B for no other reason than that it believed that society would be better off if B
owned the land than A. This, on its face appears to contradict Justice O’Conner’s own statement
that "one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a
justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid."146
To be fair, the transfers in Midkiff did not simply transfer property from A to B, but from
large groups of As to large groups of Bs. Thus, these private takings became public through their
volume, if not their character. Additionally, there was a public purpose present in Midkiff. The
thorny problem, however, is that the transfer was the purpose as well as the mechanism. This
begs the question of whether the fact of redistribution can justify its exercise when there are
economic benefits to the state. The fact that the Midkiff Court did not answer this question
directly is unsettling. More unsettling, however, is the fact that engaging in a public use analysis
did not force the court to confront this issue.
In discussing the Court’s engines of liberalization as applied in Berman supra, this article
suggested that a traditional step in the takings analysis involved the Court making a decision
regarding whether to use the stretching or the shrinking engine. This article further noted that the
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choice necessarily was arbitrary and ultimately would have little impact on the outcome of the
case.147 However, this does not suggest that the Court explicitly must choose between the
stretching or shrinking engines. Even under the logic of the supposedly coherent 19th Century
takings cases, all three engines may be used in tandem.
As early as Miln, the Supreme Court stated that the state police power encompassed the
State’s power to “advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for
its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to
these ends.”148 Once this power merged with takings analysis post-incorporation, the police
power extended all the way to the right of the state power spectrum. Because the public use
“restraint” simultaneously had been expanded leftward towards non-public use benefits, a large
area of overlap between the two powers developed.149 This is was precisely the confrontation
that the court faced in Mugler and is depicted in Figure 2, supra. However, this overlap only
represented a confrontation because an exercise of the police power did not require
compensation whereas an exercise of eminent domain for a pubic use did.150 Even the
defendants in Mugler conceded the state’s right to appropriate their property; they simply
demanded compensation.151 This compensation question was the only reason that the Court
needed to decide between the stretching and shrinking engines.
By the late 20th Century, however, the question of compensation had largely dropped out
of takings inquiry. Once the Supreme Court addressed the unfairness of allowing wholesale
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deprivations of property to go uncompensated simply because it was premised on the police
“power” by requiring compensation when the regulation went “too far,” use of the police power
no longer precluded compensation. In fact, in cases where the government action completely
deprived the landowner of his or her land’s value, compensation was customary.152 This
simplified the analysis by mooting the arbitrary question of whether a taking would be called an
exercise of the police power or a public use. Under one outcome, the government must provide
compensation and, under the other, the government probably also must compensate.
An extended discussion of the regulatory takings doctrine is beyond the scope of this
article. However, two comments on its premise and consequences do bear on the takings analysis
of Miln. First, the idea that compensation could be required where the “taking” was not for a
public use, or where the government’s action operated to diminish the value of, rather than seize,
the land, represents a theoretically unjustified—if equitable—expansion of the Public Use
Clause.
The public use and compensation requirements are contained in the same clause of the 5th
Amendment and are part of the same broad restriction on government takings. If the Public Use
Clause is interpreted to have narrow boundaries, there is no logical mandate for decoupling the
compensation requirement and extending its boundaries. The constitutional injunction “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,”153 does not indicate that
“compensation” is any more important than “public use;” the two requirements stand on equal
footing. Thus, basing a rule of compensation on whether the state asserts its police power—as
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opposed to a condemnation for public use—to a degree that infringes on a property’s value is an
inherently misguided constitutional disjunction.
Despite the theoretical problems associated with compensating landowners when the
Supreme Court decides that shrinking, rather than stretching, is the appropriate engine for
upholding a government action, there is a great deal of equity in awarding compensation. As
previously stated, the decision whether to shrink or to stretch is arbitrary and without practical
consequence. Thus, imposing a narrow application of the compensation requirement in the name
of logical coherence when no such sacrifice is demanded of public use is palpably unfair. Put
bluntly, if the court must mangle taking jurisprudence, the mangling at least should be
evenhanded. Viewed in this light, an incoherent an incoherent public use analysis mandates an
incoherent “regulatory takings” doctrine.
The logic of regulatory takings bears direct relevance to the Midkiff decision. Justice
O’Conner’s controversial assertion that the “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers,”154 is as theoretically unsound as it is an
unfortunately accurate description of the court’s jurisprudence. Since the end of the 19th Century,
any taking could be upheld either through stretching the Public Use Clause or shrinking it to
accommodate a police power. However, once the monetary implications of this decision are
removed, there is no need to choose an engine. Either one works equally well and, with the
assistance of the punting engine, the choice can be given to the legislature. This is illustrated
below in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Takings Analysis in Midkiff Compared with the Miln/Head Conception
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Panel A represents the state of takings law after Miln & Head. It is identical to the
diagram appearing in Figure 2 supra. Panel B represents the conception of takings law that
existed after Berman and Midkiff. Under the Miln/Head model, the state’s police power had
already swallowed Public Use completely because anything that was in a state’s power was
unhelpfully labeled “police power.” The public use line of jurisprudence had liberalized to a
significant extent by this point. However, as much as “public use” had become “public benefit,”
neither Miln nor Mugler extended this into the arena of “harm prevention.”
This article argued that, prior to Incorporation, the Public Use Clause contained an
implicit logical tension. Because federal powers were, and still are, not plenary, reading the
Public Use Clause as an affirmative grant of power enabled it to condemn land for purposes not
clearly in furtherance of an enumerated power. Broadening public use thus allowed the
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government to engage in takings that it otherwise could not. This provided an incentive for the
Federal Government to urge a broad interpretation of this clause. The more broadly public use
was construed, the more the government could do if it paid compensation. Though the
compensation requirement would deter a governmental from labeling its taking as a public use,
this price at least buys additional power.
Because the Supreme Court had articulated broad police powers for states, the natural
temptation of the state would be to label an action an exercise of the police power whenever
possible and avoid the requirement of compensation. This is most apparent in Mugler, where the
State of Kansas urged the U.S. Court to find that “the taking must be justified on some other
grounds than eminent domain.”155 No state would want to pay to exercise power that it could use
for free. To the extent that the Mugler Court was sympathetic to Kansas’ prohibition goal, it is
understandable that the Court would employ shrinking instead of stretching. Based on these
considerations, this article speculates that few state’s attorneys assigned to takings cases would
advocate for a construction of Public Use that superimposed a compensation requirement upon
pre-existing power.
Panel B of Figure 3 graphically represents Justice O’Conner’s statement that “[t]he
‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.”156 It
is absurd to think that a government restraint could cover the same area as a grant of power, at
least in theory. The definition of a restraint entails the containment, not the broadening of power.
However, as absurd as this statement may be from a theoretical perspective, post-Mugler, a state
could accomplish anything permissible under the Public Use Clause by using the shrinking
engine to invoke the police power instead. However, this does not mean that the two ‘powers’
155
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were coterminous. No recorded case exists from the 19th Century in which a state asked the court
to find a compensable taking where authority under the police power was clear.157 Thus, while it
is fair to say that the police power, post-Mugler, extended all the way to the left of the power
continuum, the Public Use Clause probably did not extend nearly as far leftward.
The language of Berman marked a slight departure from earlier takings theory even
though it achieved the same practical results. In Berman, the Court found a public use,
apparently because it agreed with the state’s contention that the action was justified under the
state’s police power.158 As explained supra, this seemingly oxymoronic holding had no practical
effect on takings law because compensation had become possible at every point of the state
power continuum when government action went “too far” in diminishing the interest of the
landowner.159 Though the “character of the governmental action” prong of the regulatory takings
test probably meant that the likelihood of a compensation award increased significantly toward
the right end of the continuum160 and decreased as the action approached the left, the
disappearance of a bright line practical distinction in the outcomes achieved by stretching or
shrinking, eliminated the need to state which of the first two engines the courts had employed
before punting. Because the practical differences between application of the police power or that
Public Use Clause to any given case had so greatly eroded, Justice O’Conner’s statement that the
public use requirement is coterminous with the state’s police power becomes true for all practical
purposes.
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Based on these observations, Midkiff does not represent any more of a departure from
well-establish takings law than did Berman. The practical consequences for compensation that
stretching or shrinking entailed at the time of Mugler, were largely erased by the late 20th
Century due to the emergence of the regulatory takings doctrine. This, however, simply meant
that the Court no longer needed to make an arbitrary choice in applying takings analysis and the
landowner no longer would be deprived of compensation based on the Court’s choice. Takings
jurisprudence may have been just as convoluted after Midkiff as it was after Mugler. However,
to the extent that the Midkiff Court’s analysis was not more arbitrary or unviable than Mugler’s,
and to the extent that a property owner could obtain compensation in more situations in 1984
than he or she could in 1886, there is no basis for concluding that takings analysis had
“deteriorated” in any new or meaningful way between Mugler and Kelo. The only new
developments were an increased level of candor regarding the state of takings analysis and a
greater possibility that a government action could require compensating the landowner.
iii. Kelo
This article began with the propositions that Kelo did not diminish the rights of private
property owners or further erode the coherence of takings jurisprudence in any novel or
meaningful way. Previous sections demonstrated how the pre-Incorporation era Supreme Court
interpreted police power and public use broadly and without reference to each other, resulting in
an unviable post-Incorporation takings rubric. The analytical takings framework of the late 19th
Century remained largely in place through the course of the 20th Century and, to the extent that
any theoretical deterioration had occurred, it had not further diminished property rights. The only
remaining question regarding the Supreme Court’s historical application of the public use/police

54

power analysis is whether Kelo increased the incoherence of takings analysis in any way that the
preceding century of case law had not.
In Kelo, the City of New London created a corporation called the New London
Development Corporation (NLDC) for the purposes of implementing the city’s plans to revitalize
its severely slumping economy.161 As part of this effort, the NLDC developed a plan to condemn
multiple tracts of private residential property bordering a local park for the purpose of tearing
down the existing homes and building an upscale “urban village” containing office space,
restaurants, stores and new homes.162 This development was expressly intended to capitalize on
the Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Company’s decision to build a large facility on adjacent land.163 To
this end, the “urban village” was designed to provide attractive spending opportunities to the
large influx of Pfizer employees and, thereby, generate needed revenue for the City.164
Several homeowners whose land was condemned for the proposed development
complained that the takings were not for a public use because their homes were not blighted and
also because the condemnations were expressly intended to benefit the employees of a single
private corporation.165
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the takings after noting that the “disposition of this
case…turns on the question whether the City's development plan serves a public purpose” and
that the category of public purposes is “broad and inclusive.”166 Writing for the majority,
Justice John Paul Stevens stated that
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Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted
that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to
another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is
equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future
"use by the public" is the purpose of the taking.167
Justice Stevens then noted that The Supreme Court “long ago rejected any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the general public” 168 and that “promoting
economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government.”169 After
articulating these propositions, Stevens then quoted Berman and Midkiff’s holdings that the
government’s judgments regarding both the public interest and the means of attaining that
interest were entitled to great deference.170
Before disposing of the case, Stevens specifically addressed Kelo’s two arguments that
the stated purpose of providing an attractive community for Pfizer employees violated the Public
Use Clause and that there should be a per se rule against takings for the sole purpose of
“economic development.” To counter the first argument, Stevens observed
the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties.
For example, in Midkiff, the forced transfer of property conferred a direct and significant
benefit on those lessees who were previously unable to purchase their homes.171
In response to the second argument, Stevens opined that there was no “principled way of
distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that we have
recognized.”172 Based on these rationales, Stevens found such takings to be valid public uses.
At first blush, the Kelo opinion appears rather unexceptional. The Court employed the
stretching engine to include economic development with the ambit of the Public Use Clause and
167
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then the punting engine to avoid determining whether the use truly was public or reasonably
suited to achieve its purpose. None of this is particularly new and none of Steven’s remarks
contain any novel attack on a landowner’s rights in private property. In fact, the Court’s
emphasis on the fact that condemnation plan was “comprehensive” and preceded by “thorough
deliberation” could be read to suggest that the Kelo Court demanded more from the government
before it would uphold a taking than did the Berman and Midkiff Courts.173
The fact that Kelo employed the same engines of liberalization in much the same way
that they have always been used raises the question of why the dissent so vigorously opposed
what, essentially was ‘more of the same.’ This question is all the more perplexing considering
that Justice O’Conner wrote both a lengthy dissent in Kelo and the majority opinion in Midkiff.
In her Kelo dissent, O’Conner argued that the “Government may compel an individual to
forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for the benefit of another private person.”174
However, she previously had found in Midkiff that the systematic transfer of land from wealthy
landowners to their poor tenants was an acceptable public use even though no one except the
tenants who previously lived on the land would use it afterwards.175 In justifying the earlier
Midkiff takings, O’Conner noted that the concentration of land “skewed the fee simple
market.”176 The proposed solution entailed granting the direct benefit of land ownership to the
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individual tenants in the hope that, if done on a large scale, this would normalize the market.177
The public good achieved through these measures can only be described as indirect. This simply
does not accord with O’Conner’s objection in Kelo that “if predicted (or even guaranteed)
positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another, then the
words ‘for public use’ do not realistically exclude any takings…”.178 O’Conner, of course, is
right that the words “for public use” are a rather meaningless restraint. However, she was the
same justice who opined that the “public use requirement is…coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign's police powers.”179 Why the change of heart?
O’Conner attempts to distinguish Midkiff by stating that “[in Midkiff], the relevant
legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy the
harm.”180 However, O’Conner’s statement of the facts is simply wrong. In Midkiff, the problem
at issue had nothing to do with how the land was used; the problems inured solely in the fact of
ownership. There was no expectation that the former lessees would use their land in any new
way that would increase tax revenue or that their land would itself be available to the public.
Indeed, Hawaii’s proposed solution, if it worked perfectly, would have resulted in the same
people using the land in exactly the same way as they had before.181 O’Conner’s claim that the
public benefit in Kelo—where the city at least proposes lucrative new uses for the land—is any
more of an indirect benefit than that in Midkiff, thus, is laughable.
That O’Conner is wrong in her belief that Kelo can be legally distinguished from Midkiff
does not diminish the fact that there is something about the latter case that bothered her, which
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was absent in the former.182 If the indirectness of the benefit is not the cause, perhaps it is the
fact that a single corporation stands to gain from the transaction in Kelo, whereas in Midkiff,
thousands of individual tenants would gain. It also is possible that O’Conner simply thought that
correcting the evils of “oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth”183 was a more compelling
governmental objective than combating a severely slumping local economy. However, if the
direct beneficiary is only the mechanism for effectuating the ultimate public use, then the fact
that there is one mechanism or ten thousand should not be relevant to the question of whether the
ultimate benefit is public. Similarly, if the Supreme Court punts the identification of both the
public purpose and the means to best effectuate that to the legislature, it would make little sense
for the Court to then weigh the importance of one identified public purpose with another. The
fact that O’Conner’s is unable to clearly articulate her objections to Kelo using the public
use/police power rubric demonstrates the incoherence of the Supreme Court’s takings analysis
with as much force as the Kelo holding itself.
Section 6- “Smaller Pegs and Holes:” The Practicality and Coherence of Conservative
Approaches to Takings Jurisprudence
As previously demonstrated, principled takings analysis cannot proceed unless a court
first makes an arbitrary, and often meaningless, decision regarding where to draw the line
between public use and the police power. The incoherent and arbitrary nature of this analysis
breeds judicial frustration and encourages increased use of the punting engine.
The fact that labeling a taking as an exercise of the police power or a public use is no
longer determinative of the compensation issue—and has long been irrelevant to the
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government’s ability to appropriate—may explain why the punting engine has become the most
visible of the three engines of liberalization in the 20th Century cases. In fact, neither the Kelo
majority nor concurring opinions mentions the words “police power” even once!184 However, as
exasperating as critics may find the Supreme Court’s reflexive deference to legislative
determinations, the punting engine does not frustrate judicial review; it merely saves courts from
confronting the impossibility of such review.
The forgoing analysis forcefully suggests that the Supreme Court’s takings rubric had
become unworkable under it own terms. However, this leaves open the question of whether this
rubric is unviable on all terms or whether clarity can be restored by narrowing the concepts of
the police power and Public Use Clause to more conservative and literalist meanings. The
answer to this question requires examination of the arguments of two of the most prominent
conservative critics of the prevailing rubric, Justice Thomas and Professor Epstein.
i.-The High Price of Coherence: The Literalist Approach of Justice Clarence Thomas
In his Kelo dissent, Justice Thomas argues that it is “imperative that the Court maintain
absolute fidelity to “the [Public Use] Clause.”185 According to Thomas, such fidelity requires
that the clause be read literally to prohibit the government from taking property except “for
public use.”186
Thomas’ approach is very alluring for several reasons. First, the fact that the Public Use
Clause would simply duplicate the Necessary and Proper Clause if the term “public use” did not
have a fixed and narrow meaning militates in favor of interpreting the clause fairly literally to
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give it an independent effect under established cannons of construction.187 Second, Thomas
persuasively argues that “the phrase ‘public use’ contrasts with the very different phrase ‘general
welfare’ used elsewhere in the Constitution.”188 This demonstrates that the framers of the Bill of
Rights knew how to suggest a broader meaning and chose not to do so in the Public Use Clause.
Interpreting public use literally is the only method of giving effect to this textual distinction.
A third advantage of the literalist approach is its ease of application. Though there is
some room for ambiguity on issues such as what percentage of the public must have access and
whether a charge may be imposed,189 determining whether the condemnation is for an actual
public use usually should be as straightforward as deciding whether the construction plans call
for a public road or a private mansion.
Fourth and most importantly, the literalist approach appears, at least on its face, to offer
the promise of greater protections for private property owners against government takings
because the reasons for a taking are so limited.
The apparent theoretical simplicity and practical advantages of a literalist interpretation
are strong incentives, especially given the present incoherence of the broader takings analysis.
However, the initial appeal of this approach disguises numerous fatal flaws.
Restricting government takings to those situations where a public use can be
demonstrated necessarily mandates that that, where the government cannot prove such a direct
public use, no taking will be allowed. However, even the earliest Supreme Court cases
demonstrate that there are many situations in which the government would have a need to
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employ eminent domain for non-public uses that most people would acknowledge as reasonable
and necessary. One such example appears in the Beasley opinion discussed in section 1 supra.
There the Supreme Court noted that “It would be a poor consolation to the people of this town to
give them the power of going in and out of the town upon a railroad, while they were refused the
means of grinding their wheat.”190 Unless the government is willing to forgo using the power of
eminent domain to develop needed agricultural or industrial services where these operations are
run by private businesses or not necessarily open for general public use,191 strict adherence to a
“use by the public” test exalts form over function.
Mills and other service providers are borderline examples because they could fall within
the “common carrier” rubric of public use.192 However, an even clearer example can be found in
government condemnations of land for military bases. Few people would argue that a
government should not take necessary steps to defend its citizens. Viewed from a layman’s
perspective, the government’s power—if not its duty—to use the eminent domain powers for
such purposes appears beyond obvious. However, applying the literalist interpretation of public
use would invalidate such a taking unless these bases compromised their security by allowing
general public use and access.
Justice Thomas attempts to circumvent the ramifications of a strict public use test even as
he advocates its adoption. In analyzing the Supreme Court’s adoption of a public purpose test in
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Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,193 Thomas goes to great lengths to find an actual public use
to justify the construction of an irrigation ditch. Thomas eventually concludes that a public use
was present because a statute provided that citizens who “owned land irrigated by the ditch had a
right to use it.”194 Thomas’s logic here is flimsy because, in his own words, only those
landowners adjacent to the ditch had the right to use it. This does not allow use by the general
public unless “general public” is defined to include only those people who own land that happens
to be adjacent to the ditch. If a ditch is constructed in an area with large farms, this “general
public” may include only six or seven landowners.
Thomas makes a second, even more suspect, effort to soften the rigidity of his literalist
approach by stating that lands “owned by the government” are “public uses” ipso facto.195
Concededly, this assertion finds support in Supreme Court precedent.196 Nonetheless it is
logically unsupportable. A strict public use test allows courts to ascertain the beneficiaries of the
exercise of eminent domain by examining whether the public actually uses the land. Inquiry into
who holds title to the land is relevant only to the extent that it is probative of the ultimate issue of
use. Actual use must remain the touchstone of a literalist public use test for one very practical
reason. Namely, if government retention of title to the land conclusively determined the question
of public use, then the Public Use Clause could be circumvented by a local government retaining
title to the land, while granting the benefits of its use to a private party. This possibility may
appear laughable at first glance, however, the fact that the Public Use Clause was a restriction on
the ability of government to appropriate land, suggests that the possibility of government misuse
of the power was of great concern to the framers of the Bill of Rights.
193
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Without employing artifices such as a “public ownership” exception, a court is left with
only two possibilities in all situations where the government desires to acquire land for a public
need beyond actual use. The first option is to preclude the government from acquiring the land,
and force it to navigate such market forces as hold-outs and other opportunistic property owners.
This would make the provision of many needed public benefits so expensive that the government
often would not be able to provide them to citizens. Because this approach has such great
potential to cripple many government efforts or force them to impose higher taxes on citizens,
courts are unlikely to adopt this approach.
The second option that courts have is to allow the government to acquire the land through
some other power. Given the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the police power over
the past one and a half centuries and the practical needs of society, it is overwhelmingly likely
that the Supreme Court would adopt this approach. Because the requirements of the Public Use
Clause could not be applied in such situations, courts would have no logical basis for mandating
government compensation of landowners when a regulation or other government action that is
not a public use “goes too far” and destroys the value of property. This would leave property
owners with even less protection than they enjoy under the current system of jurisprudence.
These observations demonstrate that even those critics who advocate a strict public use
requirement demand more from the takings analysis then its terms defensibly can provide.
Unless conservatives were willing to allow numerous exceptions to the strict public use test, such
a conception of Public Use Clause is overwhelmingly likely to hurt the interests of both society
and individual landowners. To the extent that these exceptions are allowed, however, the
literalist approach loses much of its initial attractiveness.
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ii.-“Square Pegs, Round Holes, and a Few Rolls of Duct Tape:” Reading Coherence Back
into Takings Jurisprudence through Epstein’s Theories.
Professor Epstein comprehensively examines the Public Use Clause and police power
through the lens of John Locke’s theories on the relationship between individuals, private
property and the state in his book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
(“Takings”).197 It is beyond the scope of this article to critique Epstein’s use of Lockean Theory
or to provide a general exegesis of his work on the broad subject of eminent domain
jurisprudence. Instead, this section focuses on his interpretations of public use and the police
power to determine whether his formulations of these concepts offer a better alternative to those
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. The Police Power, Crime, and Anti-Nuisance
Epstein argues that “any adequate accounts of the ends served by the police power
limitation should be congruent with the language and aims of the takings clause” 198.and that
neither the Lochner Court’s articulation of the police power as containing “those powers…that
relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public”199 nor the modern view of
the police power as all state power are conceptually viable.200 Specifically, Epstein states that
Both the traditional and modern formulations go beyond the Lockean conception and are
too broad to be defended in analytical terms. The legitimate state interest test in vogue
today is a bare conclusion, tantamount to asserting that the action is legitimate because it
is lawful.201
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This assertion is consistent with the analyses of the Supreme Court’s application of the police
power in the preceding sections of this article. Epstein also is correct to observe that the
incoherence of the police power is “the entering wedge to allow, encourage, and indeed justify
judges to reach whatever result they prefer on any given state of affairs.”202 The Supreme Court’s
ability to set the boundaries of the police power at different points in individual cases is very
much related to the shrinking engine postulated by this article. However, the shrinking engine
does not allow judges to reach “whatever result they prefer,” as Epstein claims.
Because the Supreme Court has refused to find a gap between the police power and the
Public Use Clause on the state power continuum, shrinking can only function as an engine of
liberalization, allowing the state to exercise more—never less—power. A narrow reading of the
police power necessarily results in an expansive reading of the Public Use Clause. Thus, judges
can justify “whatever result they prefer” only so long as they prefer to find the taking valid.203
Epstein follows his criticisms of the modern Supreme Court’s interpretation of the police
power by articulating a narrower variant of this principle.
The relationship between public use and the police power is well captured in an analogy
drawn from private law—the distinction between self-defense and private necessity. Self
defense allows one to inflict harm without compensating the person harmed, while
private necessity creates only a conditional privilege, which allows the harm to be
inflicted but only upon payment….The police power gives the state control over the full
catalogue of common law wrongs…including force and misrepresentation, deliberate or
accidental, against other persons, including private nuisances.204
This conceptualization of the police power has several attractive features. First, the analogy to
private law fits well within Lockean Theory’s position that a government obtains the rights those
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individuals formerly possesses in a state of nature.205 Consonance with a particular philosopher’s
social theory, of course, is not the touchstone of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, the fact that
Epstein’s police power can be explained according to any theory is an advantage over the
Supreme Court’s present jurisprudence. Second, the boundaries of Epstein’s police power are far
easier to define and apply in practice. Where the government prevents wrongful conduct, it need
not compensate. Where the conduct is not wrongful, compensation must be paid. A third
advantage is that Epstein’s police power comports with a very basic sense of equity. A property
owner does not have a right to commit wrongful acts. Thus, disrupting those acts should not
require compensation. In contrast, a property owner does have a right to engage in lawful acts
and, thus, loses something when those acts are stopped. However, these attractive features of
Epstein’s police power disguise conceptual and practical deficiencies.
The first problem with Epstein’s police power is the difficulty of defining a “wrong.” As
Epstein defines the term, it encompasses crimes and torts involving “force or fraud” as well as
common law nuisances.206 In the first instance, the question of what constitutes a “nuisance” is
not altogether clear. Epstein comments on this problem by reference to the difficult case of
Miller v. Shoene, which stands at the periphery of nuisance law.207 After stating his position on
the case in qualified language, Epstein notes that
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the intellectual difficulty of these narrow points conceals their institutional importance.
Some uncertainty must be tolerated at the edges’ sound social institutions will never
stand or fall on the marginal classification issues that test every legal doctrine.208
A coherent takings analysis need not account for every possible set of facts that can develop in
society. However, it must be able to account for the most common scenarios. Miller falls within
the not-uncommon category of situations where one person’s use of land harms others but is not
wrongful in and of itself. If there is “uncertainty at the edges” of nuisance law then this may not
be the best place to draw a bright line between the police power and takings for public use.
Epstein’s unexplained inclusion of crimes involving “force or fraud” within the police
power exacerbates the uncertainty of his police power. No answer is given to the question,
“What wrongs involve force or fraud and how does one use their property to commit them?”
Assuming that a list of crimes and torts involving force or fraud can be developed, the next
question is “Can this list change over time?” The question is important because if Epstein desires
to freeze the list of wrongs that can trigger a police power response in time, then this area of law
no longer will be able to change in response to new situations. However, if Epstein’s police
power allows the law to change—as it must—then there must be a system for determining what
new crimes or wrongs would be included. Such a system invites at least as much legislative
mischief and ad hoc review as it avoids.209 To the extent that the police power has narrow
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boundaries on the other side of which lies the compensation requirement, these boundaries must
not be “uncertain.”
A second problem with Epstein’s formulation of the police power is its
underinclusiveness. Epstein’s limitation of the police power’s bounds to nuisances, force and
fraud leaves many important areas unaddressed. The most obvious of these are crimes that do not
involve force or fraud. It is doubtful that Epstein seriously advocates that the state compensate
landowners before closing down brothels, as the Mugler Court chided.210 However, operating a
brothel, though criminal in most jurisdictions, does not involve force or fraud. Epstein’ strict
“physical invasion” test requires the harm from one landowner’s property to cross the property
line—such as when smoke, pollutions or noxious odors invade neighbors’ properties—before the
harm can be declared a nuisance.211 Does a quietly-operated brothel meet this test? If not, would
the average person deem it any less a nuisance if it was located next to his or her home?
The underinclusiveness of Epstein’s police power has implications beyond the exclusion
of crime. Epstein further finds the police power inapplicable to legislation for the purposes of
rent control,212 wetlands protection,213 flood control,214 and regulation of strip mining215 unless
some “wrong” is committed. If the government desires to legislate on these subjects, Epstein’s
analysis would require compensation for all property owners who lost value as a result.216 This
certainly provides a high degree of protection for private property owners. However, the facility
with which the borders of the police power can be crossed means that many types of legislation
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would become fantastically costly. Thus, as attractive as Epstein’s police power may appear to
defenders of private property, it raises serious questions as to whether society would be prepared
to pay the costs of these rights and whether courts would be willing to honor them consistently
over time.
B. The Public Use Clause and “Public Goods”
Epstein links the issue of the Public Use Clause’s proper scope with a modified Lockean
Theory. Stated very briefly, an organized society can produce wealth more efficiently than an
equal number if individuals in a state of nature.217 The difference between the amount of wealth
that a given number of individuals could accumulate in a state of nature and the amount of
wealth that the same number of individuals could accumulate in society is the “surplus.”218
Epstein’s conception of Lockean Theory demands that the government of the society return all
surplus—minus that needed to operate the government—to the individual members of the
society, on a pro rata basis.219 According to Epstein, one of the fundamental purposes of the
Public Use Clause is to ensure that the government does not use its eminent domain power to
grant disproportionate surplus to influential individuals or groups.220
This surplus theory is outlined above because it informs Epstein’s conception of the
Public Use Clause to such a high degree. However, this section argues that Epstein’s emphasis
on interpreting the Public Use Clause to fit within Lockean Theory—as opposed to within the
text of the Constitution—is a significant analytical shortcoming.
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Epstein asserts that there are three categories of permissible public use. The first is rooted
in the economic theory of “public goods” and includes government services such as national
defense. A public good requires two elements: 1) non-exclusivity and 2) minimal costs
associated with increasing the number of beneficiaries.221 National defense is non-exclusive
because “the act of providing protection for one citizen also provides it for his neighbor.”222 A
citizen cannot practically refuse the benefit of this service. Similarly, the marginal costs of
providing this service to 100 citizens is not proportionally lower than the cost of providing it for
10,000 citizens.223 Thus, government condemnations for the purpose of building military bases,
lighthouses and other generalized public services satisfy the Public Use Clause under the same
logic as national defense.
Epstein’s second category of public uses includes services such as parks and highways,
which individual citizens can refuse to use. Epstein notes that these services do have
proportionally increasing marginal costs and that they are public “only because the government
chooses to provide them.” Nonetheless, he concludes that the eminent domain power “surely
[can] be used to acquire land…for these purposes.”224
Epstein’s labels the final category of valid public uses “private takings for public use.”225
These takings encompass the controversial “indirect benefits” at issue in Berman, Midkiff, and
Kelo where eminent domain is used to transfer property from one private citizen to another under
the theory that the second citizen will use the property to provide a public benefit that the first
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citizen could not.226 For a taking in this category to be valid, Epstein asserts that two conditions
must be met. First, there must be a “bilateral monopoly born of necessity.”227 Second, some
effort must be made to divide the surplus between the [transferring and acquiring parties].”228
Epstein asserts that the Supreme Court’s early Mill Act Cases are explainable under the
bilateral monopoly/surplus division framework. A bilateral monopoly exists where “there is only
one buyer and one seller, resulting in transactional delays because each party can hold out for a
better deal without fearing that the other party will turn [elsewhere]”229 Epstein claims that this
situation was in play with Mill Act Cases because damming a river for the mill always would
cause upstream land to flood.230 The owner of the mill had no ability to choose between different
parcels of land and, if the owner(s) of the upstream parcels refused to sell their land—perhaps in
hopes of driving up the price—then the mill could not be built.231 Because mills were essential
to local industry, the public would benefit if the government used eminent domain. Further,
because the mill owner was constrained by the bilateral monopoly, there is less danger that he or
she is using the government to “assert his dominion and will over another,”232 or so Epstein’s
argument runs.
After identifying the existence of a bilateral monopoly in the Mill Act Cases, Epstein
next notes that many of the states were required to pay 150% of the property’s value before they

226

Id. at 169-80 (discussing what circumstances must be present for one of these takings to be
valid).
227
Id. at 181.
228
Id. Epstein propounds this general rule within the specific context of rent control statutes.
This article, therefore, distills his specific statement that the surplus must be divided between the
“landlord and then tenant” into the underlying economic proposition on which it is based.
229
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).
230
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS at 173.
231
Id.
232
Id.
72

could condemn it.233 Epstein reasons that, in such a situation, the owner of the mill and the owner
of the property to be condemned became “the public” and each obtained “a pro rata share of the
gain to the extent that ordinary institutions can provide it.”234 Thus, Epstein reasons that the
surplus is evenly divided among the public, satisfying his second criterion.235
There are many grounds for contesting the application of Epstein’s bilateral
monopoly/division of surplus theory to the Mill Act Cases on a theoretical level. However,
because this section is concerned with the broader and more fundamental problems associated
with Epstein’s hypothesis, it is only appropriate here to point out the two most obvious problems.
First, “born of necessity” is a slippery concept that begs the question, “whose necessity?”
The mill may be beneficial for the local community but this does not mean it is necessary.
Indeed, because so few improvements are necessary for the continued survival of a community,
public necessity would be an unreasonably restrictive requirement for takings. It also would
place non-elected judges in the position of deciding whether a taking that the entire population
and their elected government finds important rises to the heights of necessity. If “born of
necessity” means only that the mill owner must use the particular parcel of condemned land, then
necessity is satisfied any time a person proposes a project that requires using his neighbor’s land.
Such a safeguard on property not only is easily bypassed, it is fundamentally misdirected,
focusing on the needs of the mill owner as opposed to the needs of society.236
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The second problem inuring in Epstein’s hypothesis is that the 150% price actually
divides the surplus equitably between the two parties. This simply is not realistic. There is no
method of adequately valuating the surplus wealth that the mill will generate at the time of
condemnation. Even Epstein acknowledges that “one should not demand perfect precision
because there is no way to provide it.”237 However, this “uncertainty at the edges” argument
disguises two important facts: 1) there is no method of even roughly approximating the amount
of surplus that a long-term project will bring, and 2) division of the surplus is not a fair method
of valuating compensation—it has nothing to do with public use—because it encourages the
owners of worthless land to hold out for condemnation whenever they think that the project will
generate the surplus. Such heavy-handed protection of private property utterly divorces the
compensation question from the land’s subjective or market value.
Notwithstanding the “uncertainty at the edges” of Epstein’s categories of valid public
uses, they are fairly good descriptions of many of the Supreme Court’s holdings. An analysis of
Epstein’s application of the bilateral monopoly/division of surplus rubric to the Mill Act Cases
reveals that the rubric not only fits, it is tailor-made. However, therein lies the most fundamental
problem with Epstein’s categories of public use.
One of the great dangers in superimposing a new theoretical framework on past cases is
that the theory can fit the facts perfectly while utterly failing to capture the underlying forces that
caused the case to be decided as it was. Any number of theories, from “bilateral monopolies” to a
special exception for mills can be crafted to fit the facts. However, the fact a theory can be made
to fit does not mean that is should be used. Ultimately, Epstein’s analysis of the Mill Act Cases is
to prove this has the potential to generate prohibitively long and expensive discovery processes.
If the latter interpretation is employed, then “born of necessity” becomes an almost laughably
easy test affording few protections for property owners.
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more concerned with Lockean Theory than it is with constitutional text or the realities of the
case. As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed in his Lochner
dissent, “[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.”238
Even conceding that the Mill Act cases fit within the “bilateral monopoly/division of surplus”
theory perfectly and that John Locke would approve of takings to provide “public goods,” the
question remains “what does any of this have to do with whether a taking meets requirements of
the Public Use Clause?
The only answer that Epstein provides is the rather conclusory statement that his theory
“is consistent with the general pattern of [the Founder’s] arguments and the language in which
they expressed it.”239 With only this proof, Epstein’s statement that “the language of public use
invites the theory of public goods”240 is more conclusion than argument.
C. Duct Tape Can’t fix Everything: Assembling Epstein’s Takings Theory
The overriding theme in Epstein’s conceptions of the police power and Public Use Clause
is to greatly limit the situations in which the government can take property without compensation
under the police power241 while dramatically expanding public use to require compensation for
many types of government action previously categorized as exercises of the police power.242
However, Epstein’s analysis accomplishes more than moving the boundary line between the
police power and the Public Use Clause far to the left on the state power continuum. Epstein’s
theory also decreases overall state power to condemn in certain instances by excluding them
from both the police power and the Public Use Clause. This is illustrated in Figure 4 infra.
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Figure 4. Epstein’s Analytical Takings Framework
Preventing a Public Harm
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Compensation Always Required
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Epstein’s police power encompasses only nuisances that physically invade neighboring land and
crimes and torts involving force or fraud.243 Epstein’s Public Use Clause encompasses takings to
provide public goods that citizens must use, takings where the government retains ownership of
the land and uses it to provide a service that citizens can choose to use, and private takings where
there is a bilateral monopoly born of necessity. However, despite his innovative use of economic
theory to draw the lines between these two concepts, Epstein retains the Supreme Court’s
overarching analytical dichotomy between public use and police power. Rather than articulating
new categories, Epstein’s focus is on “moderating the line drawing problem” between the
existing categories.244 Thus, Epstein’s analysis shares one essential trait—and one essential
failing—with Thomas’s and the majority’s test in Kelo: an action must be characterized either as
police power or public use.
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Despite using the same dichotomous takings model as Thomas and the Supreme Court
majority, Epstein injects a new dimension into the debate through his careful sculpting of the
police power and public use concepts. Specifically, he raises the possibility that a taking
designed to effectuate some public purpose might not be allowed under either the police power
or the Public Use Clause. In essence, those purposes fall into an analytic “void” that either
precludes state action or simply precludes analysis depending on whether Epstein’s model is
used as for lawmaking or analysis. These voids are depicted by the white spaces on the state
power continuum in Figure 4.245
Section 6(ii)a supra demonstrated that Epstein’s police power excludes many forms of
harmful conduct and argued that a literal application of Epstein’s theory would allow brothels to
remain in business because they do not involve force or fraud category, are not physically
invasive nuisances, and because taking them would deprive the owner of the property rights in
their income.246 If the police power cannot be employed here, the question becomes whether the
state can regulate through the public use rubric. Because Epstein limits public use to three
categories, this question must be broken down into three parts: 1) does the brothel present a
bilateral monopoly, the necessity of which justifies regulation? 2) would closing the brothel
result in the government using the land to provide a service? and 3) does shutting down the
brothel result in the creation of a public good? The irrelevance of the first two categories should
be clear without further analysis. However, the question is a little more difficult with regard to
the third category.
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The elimination of the brothel arguably can be categorized as furthering the public
purpose of health or morality (the traditional domain of the police power). The next inquiry is
whether this benefit is exclusive and whether the marginal costs of providing it increase as the
benefit is provided to more people. At this point, the analysis breaks down. It is possible to argue
the exclusivity and cost questions either way without proving anything more than that the
analysis is poorly suited to answering the question.
This article does not seriously suggest that that a court applying Epstein’s analysis would
allow the brothel to continue. Nor does it suggest that the court would make compensation a
precondition of its termination. However, the fact that a strict application of Epstein’s analysis
would lead a court down this fairytale road suggests that there is something seriously amiss with
Epstein’s analysis. It is absurd to suggest that a judge would engage in an extensive analysis of
the police power and the Public Use Clause to determine whether the property rights of a brothel
owner have been violated. Certainly—read hopefully—common sense would prevail long before
this. However, the fact that Epstein’s formulations of the police power and Public Use Clause
dictate such an analysis make one of two results inevitable: courts either will ignore the analysis
altogether or expand the boundaries of the police power to fill in these voids. Where the example
is as ridiculous as a pimp demanding his property rights in court, a judge most likely would
pursue the former. However, in a more serious case, the latter route is more likely.
The problem of “the void” exists on the benefit conference side of the state power
spectrum as well. To illustrate this, it is helpful to borrow an example from the Supreme Court’s
past cases. In Midkiff, the state of Hawaii was faced with overly concentrated land ownership
that hurt the state’s economy.247 This example will exaggerate the problem in two ways. First,
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the majority of the state’s land will be held by only five or ten private citizens. Second, the
effects of this concentrated land ownership on the state’s economy will be so dire that they
would threaten to undermine the state’s solvency. These modifications are designed to put the
state into a position where it must act. The question then becomes whether the Epstein model
will allow the state to act.
Epstein’s conception of the police power requires an invasive nuisance, force or fraud to
operate. Unless the Hawaiian property owner acquired the property through force or fraud, the
state will not be able to use the police power. The fact that the intangible concept of ownership
cannot physically invade a neighbor’s land precludes the finding of a nuisance. So far, this does
not change the outcome of Midkiff because the legislature provided compensation despite the
use of a police power rationale.248 However, the outcome does change when the state resorts to
Epstein’s public use rubric.
The Hawaii legislature’s action cannot be called a “public good” because each property
must be targeted on an individual basis. The aggregated benefit may be public, but each instance
of the taking is exclusive to the two parties involved. This legislature’s action also fails the
marginal cost test because for each new citizen covered, the state must loan up to 99% of the
cost.249 Thus, the marginal cost of extending the benefit is directly proportional to the number of
people covered.
The title transfer program cannot be justified as a government-provided service because
the legislature does not plan to occupy the land and make it available to the general public. This
leaves only the bilateral monopoly argument. In Midkiff, the property owners did not want to sell
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because of the associated tax consequences and the tenants could not afford to buy.250 This
represents a breakdown in commerce, but it is not a bilateral monopoly problem. The landowner
would suffer the same tax consequences by selling to another tenant and the tenant’s poverty
would preclude purchase without regard to which property he or she desired. Second, the
Hawaii legislature does not pay a premium to the landowner in an attempt to divide the
surplus.251 Thus, the title transfer project flunks the bilateral monopoly test on both counts and
the legislature is left without a justifying public use for addressing the social problem caused by
the pattern of land holding.
D. The Problem of Analytical Rigidity
The fact that Epstein’s model precludes Midkiff-style takings does not necessarily reflect
an analytical failure. In fact, people concerned with increasing the protections for private
property may find the model attractive for precisely this reason. Such people also would see the
voids more as zones of protection. However, even if the theoretical problems in Epstein’s
analysis could be removed a rule requiring the government to compensate for environmental
protection, rent control statutes and other such benefits is deemed desirable, Epstein’s analytical
framework still contains a fatal defect: rigidity.
Epstein’s model is not a practical alternative for the Supreme Court because his analytical
framework cannot be severed from his conservative position. The coherence of his overarching
analytical framework is completely dependent upon acceptance of the boundaries that Epstein
himself has set. Any attempt to depart from these causes the framework to collapse. The
modified Midkiff example demonstrates this point simply.

250
251

Id. at 235.
See generally Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
80

The discussion of the modified Midkiff example supra ended with two conclusions, the
first of which was assumed. First, the state needed to employ the title transfer program to remain
economically viable. Second, The Epstein tests for public benefits did not allow it to do so. This
problem does not rise to the theoretical level so long as a court is willing to enjoin the state from
taking the necessary action and the state is willing to abide by the court’s determination.
However, such a situation places enormous pressures on a court to bend its analysis to
accommodate the necessary state action. This pressure exists even where the state’s need is not
so dire but the benefit appears public and important.
If a judge wanted to accommodate Hawaii’s program, it would be necessary to stretch
one of Epstein’s public uses. If the court stretched the public goods rubric, a possible rationale
might weigh the perceived benefit against the marginal cost of extending the benefit to others
and, concluding that the benefit was greater than the cost, would find a marginal cost of less than
zero. Similarly, when analyzing “exclusivity,” the court could aggregate the thousands of
individual takings to find non-exclusivity or focus the exclusivity analysis on the indirect benefit
of an improved economy. This mode of analysis has two important implications. First, it allows
the court to achieve what appears to be the necessary or sensible result. Second, it eviscerates the
public goods test, leaving an empty shell of a rule that can be satisfied by any private takings that
confers an indirect benefit on the public. Once a court departs from Epstein’s parameters—
which over the course of decades it will repeatedly be tempted to do—no limiting principle
remains that can be applied in the next case on the court’s docket. This rigidity also is present in
Epstein’s other categories under both the police power and public use because each category
demands that a taking meet stringent requirements.
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The inflexibility of Epstein’s tests replicates the problem of the original dichotomy
between public use and police power. Once a court abandons the idea that a taking must be for
an actual public use, no clear limiting principle remains. “Public need” is no closer to “public
use” than “public benefit” or “public convenience.” Thus, once a court retreats from its original
position, no foothold exists to stop the analytical freefall. Epstein’s analysis does more than
simply replicate the Supreme Court’s analytical difficulties in proxy form; his analysis
necessarily reduces back to the same flawed model. Once Epstein’s categories of public use and
police power are stretched beyond their original parameters to fill the voids in state power, they
lose their distinct theoretical identities and become broad, overlapping paths to the same ultimate
destination: the question of whether the conduct is a valid exercise of the police power or valid
public use. At this point, Epstein’s analytical model is no more than the same dichotomous
police power/public use analysis, with the boundary line between these two concepts pushed far
to the left on the state power continuum to reflect Epstein’s conservative views. Unfortunately
for Epstein, without an analytical limiting principle, there is nothing to stop courts from pushing
this line back to the right through the engines of liberalization.
The failure of Epstein’s analytical framework to present a viable alternative to the
Supreme Court’s current model is not the product of any weakness in his theoretical innovations.
In fact, many of his proposed categories have great analytic value. Epstein’s essential failing is
that, while vigorously challenging the Supreme Court’s takings analysis, he passively adopts the
same dichotomous model at the core of this analysis.
Because there is no room for a middle ground between public use and the police power in
either Epstein’s or the Supreme Court’s models and because the initial categorization of a
government action is so outcome-determinative, there is an inherent pressure to extend the police
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power to all government actions that a court believes should not require compensation and the
Public Use Clause to all government actions that the court thinks should require compensation.
Where this process operates, categorization is reduced to conclusion. Even categories based on
initially well-articulated principles ultimately break down as the government actions that each
category encompasses become less and less unified by any common characteristic outside of the
fact that some court, at some time, thought that one government action should be compensable
and another not. Efforts to restore coherence by rearticulating the original categories in rigid and
conservative terms is not sufficient to stop this process where the pressure of the conclusion is
not removed from the issue of categorization.
It is not clear why Professor Epstein would go to the trouble of creating a comprehensive
theory of takings just to build it atop the same shaky foundation as the theory he seeks to destroy.
However, while it is impossible to definitively guess Epstein’s motivations, his complete failure
to discuss the problems occasioned by Incorporation in his comprehensive book Takings and his
attempts to ascribe reason to the later Mill Act era cases forcibly suggests that Epstein, like many
eminent domain scholars, does not apprehend how far back into history the roots of the Supreme
Court’s incoherent takings jurisprudence extend. Unfortunately, Epstein’s misplaced belief in an
idyllic era of takings jurisprudence blinds him to the inherent imprecision of the dichotomous
takings model. By building his own analysis on this flawed model, Epstein shackles even his
most innovative solutions to the same analytical uncertainties that they are meant to overcome.
Section 7-“From Pegs and Holes to Practical Holdings:” Restoring Coherence to the
Takings Debate by Altering its Terms
A. Summary and Conclusions
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The specific conclusions of the foregoing sections force a broader and more fundamental
conclusion: the Supreme Court’s analytical framework and the dichotomous model on which it is
predicated are incapable of producing consistently principled and practical adjudication no
matter how much it they are restated and refined. Rejecting this flawed rubric is a necessary
precondition to bringing coherence to takings law. This raises the final question that addressed
in this article: with what can we replace this analytical framework?
B. The Way Forward
The fundamental problem with the concept of public use is that it is not possible to
stretch its rubric far enough to encompass every public appropriation that the majority of people
would regard as necessary and legitimate without transmogrifying the term into something
devoid of all intellectual integrity. At some point, honesty must compel courts to acknowledge
the simple truth that no matter what labels or tests the court employs, there are only two
categories of valid public uses: 1) those which society always regards as legitimate and 2) those
that society sometimes regards as legitimate. Examples of the former include takings for a direct
public use such as building a bridge or a road and takings where the land will be used by a
“common carrier.”252 Examples of the latter include takings for a “public benefit,” such as urban
development or economic growth. This principle applies with equal force to the police power.
Some exercises of the police power, such as abating recognized nuisances, are universally
deemed valid. Other exercises of the police power, such as for rent control or environmental
protection, are more controversial.
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Acknowledging that there are two categories of police power and public use underscores
the problem with a dichotomous analysis. However, it also suggests what contours the solution
should take. For two questions, there should be two analyses and two answers. Conceptually
severing the categories leads to much greater analytic precision. Therefore courts should reframe
their takings analysis into two questions: 1) can the taking be categorized as a clear exercise of
the police power or a clear public use? and 2) if not, then does the taking fall somewhere
between the two categories or is it entirely private? Framing the inquiry allows a court both to
determine where on the state power continuum a given government action falls and provides
clues as to how the court should analyze it. This is represented graphically in Figure 5 below
Figure 5: Reconceptualizing the Dichotomy
Panel A
Preventing a Public Harm

Creating a Public Benefit

Panel B

State Power Continuum
Clear Police Power

Preventing
Recognized
Nuisances

Zone of Uncertainty/
Police Power and Public Use Overlap

Takings for
Clear
Public Uses

Clear Public Use

This schema depicts two ideations of the state power continuum. Panel A represents the
analytical uncertainty of the prevailing dichotomous model. While there are certain government
actions that clearly fall within the ambit of the police power and public use, state actions that fall
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within the vast area between these poles possess elements of both. No coherent principle justifies
stretching one or both powers across the state power continuum because it forces courts into the
zero-sum game of labeling an ambivalent state actions either as a “clear exercise of the police
power” or a “clear public use.” Of course, where the state action is not clearly a public use or an
exercise of the police power, calling it such only derogates from the precision of the categories,
leading to muddled analysis. This results in categorization by conclusion problem discussed
supra.
Panel B represents the conservative model of the police power/public use dichotomy
from Figure 1.253 Under this model, to which Justice Thomas claims adherence, neither the
police power nor Public Use Clause is stretched beyond their logically defensible parameters.
Unfortunately, this analytic precision exacts a heavy price because, under a dichotomous
framework, a state action that neither is a public use nor an exercise of the police power cannot
be valid.254 This creates a large void under which many practical state actions fall.
A comparison of Panels A and B points toward the solution argued for in this section:
retain the clarity of Panel B and the practicality of Panel A by creating a third analytical category
which embraces the zone of ambiguity. In practice, the four categories outlined above (two
police powers and two public uses) reduce to a three-category analysis. This is because two of
the categories—1) possible exercises of the police power and 2) possible public uses—entirely
overlap. Once a court finds that the government action is intended to serve some public purpose,
then it remains only to determine whether the action is grounded in a state power which is not
subject to the Public Use Clause’s compensation requirement—what most scholars call
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“exercises of the police power”—or whether the action is grounded in state power that is subject
to the Clause’s compensation requirement. Thus, the categories of possible public use and
possible exercises of the police power collapse into the broader category that Figure 5 labels the
“zone of uncertainty.” This category is defined by the practical consideration of whether
compensation should or should not be required for a specific government action. Its boundaries
are the point beyond which compensation clearly and uncontroversially is required, on the right
of the continuum, and the point beyond which compensation clearly and uncontroversially is not
required, on the left of the continuum. Thus, if the answer to the compensation question is not
immediately clear from the nature of the government action, then such action falls within the
zone of uncertainty.
The three categories outlined above: clear public use, clear police power, and zone of
uncertainty, are the essential building blocks of the analysis urged by this article. At this point,
one might note that the zone of uncertainty appears more of a restatement of the problems in
takings analysis than a solution. However, this assumes that an action falling within the zone of
uncertainty eventually must be characterized as an act of the police power or of the takings
clause. Notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court and most takings theorists feel
compelled to label a taking as police power or public use, there is no logical reason to require
this step. As the analysis in the preceding sections has shown, once a government action falls
within the ambit of state power, the only question with any practical consequence is whether
It is important to note the existence of a fifth category: government actions intended to
effectuate entirely private purposes (i.e. actions designed solely to benefit or harm a single
citizen or group of citizens). Such government actions are not within a state power and, thus, are
not represented on the state power continuum. However, the fact that this category is not
represented does not relieve a court from the duty to enquire whether the government action is
public or private. This is a threshold question, and it is only proper for a court to engage in
takings analysis after a public purpose has been found.
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compensation should be required. Because the issue is not clear in the zone of uncertainty, there
is no reason to apply the same bright-line rules that are appropriate in the clear police power and
clear public use categories. A better approach is to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to all
actions in this category in order to determine whether compensation is fair under the
circumstances of the particular case. This intermediate level of scrutiny should parallel the
regulatory takings analysis and specifically focus on the degree to which the government action
in question is designed to correct harm caused by the property owner—such as pollution,
interference with the rights of other property owners, etc.—or confer a public benefit.
The line between conferring a public benefit and preventing harm is difficult to draw and
employing the three category framework urged in this article, concededly, cannot bring it into
sharper focus. However, what this framework can do is mitigate the practical consequences of
this uncertainty by abandoning the all-or-nothing compensation approach. Many government
actions, such as urban renewal, both abate harms caused by a landowner and confer additional
public benefits. There is no reason to forbid a government that takes possession of blighted land
from doing nothing more than restoring it to its non-blighted value. To the extent that the
government can do more with the land, society benefits all the more. However, unless the public
harm that the government seeks to abate is exactly equal to 100% of the property’s value, all
such takings must result either in a net benefit or net loss to the government. In such situations,
all-or-nothing-compensation is not appropriate and a more enlightened—and equitable—
approach would be to assign a monetary value to the harm and use it to offset any compensation
due to the landowner for the taking.255
The complete analytical framework proposed by this article appears in Figure 6.
255

This article merely introduces this rule as a general concept. The task of defining its precise
contours is appropriately left to courts to decide based on specific facts.
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Figure 6: Proposed Multi-Tiered Framework for Takings
Preventing a Public Harm
Zone of

Creating a Public Benefit
Uncertainty

State Power Continuum
Clear Exercises of
the Police Power

Rational Basis Review/
No Compensation
Intermediate Scrutiny
Scalable Compensation

Taking for
Clear Public
Uses

Rational Basis Review/
No Compensation

Takings falling within the clear public use and clear police power categories retain the all-ornothing compensation model whereas the zone of uncertainty employs scaleable compensation.
This multi-tiered framework possesses numerous advantages over the Supreme Court’s
dichotomous model. However, before these advantages may be described, principled boundaries
of these three categories should be articulated.
Three considerations must inform the process of setting boundaries for the police power
and Public Use Clause in the proposed multi-tiered framework. First, the boundaries must be
practical. When judges are forced to choose between abandoning established analyses and
achieving equitable results, they must—or at least should—choose fairness. Therefore, a takings
framework cannot force courts to make that choice if it hopes to endure. Second, the framework
must be flexible. As argued in preceding sections, rigid frameworks tailored to accommodate
specific political viewpoints will be upset completely by changes in judicial attitude.256 Thus, a
framework must be able accommodate both conservative and liberal applications without losing
its coherence. Third and finally, the framework must be Constitutional. Where concepts derive

256

This is one of the defects in Epstein’s model in section 6 (ii) supra
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from the text of the Constitution, their boundaries must be defensible according to the
document’s text.
Brief reflection on the aforementioned considerations suggests the boundaries that should
be imposed on the three categories of the multi-tiered model. The Public Use Clause states “nor
shall property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”257 The most obvious
construction of this clause—or the one that involves the least stretching—is that it only applies to
takings for an actual public use. Justice Thomas argues this point powerfully in his Kelo
dissent.258 Unfortunately, Thomas’ analysis is limited by the pressures of reaching sociallydesirable results. The proposed model removes that pressure because its structure no longer
requires judges to label actions a clear public use in order to reach specific conclusions regarding
the compensation or validity questions. Under the proposed model, a court retains the flexibility
to reach a desired outcome in the zone of uncertainty. The only consequences of such a
categorization are 1) that the court will use intermediate tier scrutiny to determine the validity of
the government action and 2) that scaleable compensation may be paid. Because this framework
relieves the pressure on the Public Use Clause, there is no reason not to restore the most
textually-defensible reading of the Clause. Therefore, the proposed model will treat only actual
public uses as “clear public uses,” subject to rational basis review and mandatory
compensation.259 “Public goods” and other public benefits will fall into the zone of uncertainty,
where they will be subject to an intermediate tier of scrutiny.
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. V (emphasis supplied).
See section 6(i) supra.
259
It is, of course possible to argue that common carriers involve actual public use even if a
citizens’ physical body is not using the property. To the extent that the common carrier exception
is non-controversial, this article would not object to including them within the category of clear
public uses. However, because a category is always easier to broaden than to narrow, the
decision whether to include common carrier is properly left to later scholars and courts.
258
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Defining the scope of the police power does not require the same attention to
Constitutional interpretation as the Public Use Clause. Because the concept is a judicial creation,
not subject to the same deference as Constitutional text, the boundaries of the police power
should be informed primarily by analytical utility. In other words, the line should be drawn
where it would be most analytically useful. This almost certainly should be the point on the state
power continuum beyond which compensation indisputably is not required. Thus, this article
largely agrees with Epstein that the police power should be limited to anti-nuisance and
common-law crime.260 Restricting the police power in this way allows a court to use the term in a
way that has a definitive meaning and a definitive consequence. However, because police power
and residual sovereignty are decoupled, a court finding that an activity does not fall within the
ambit of the police power would not automatically preclude the state from taking the action or
require compensation.
The final category that requires definition is the zone of uncertainty. Now, with the
boundaries of public use and the police power firmly in place, this zone no longer is uncertain. It
encompasses all state power that is not police power and which does not involve an exercise of
eminent domain for use by the public. This is the area with which the courts have struggled most.
As a result, this is the area where heightened review will allow a court to develop a more
complete factual record and actually wrestle with—as opposed to punt—the questions of whether
1) the activity generates a public benefit or prevents a public harm and 2) how much
compensation, if any, is appropriate. With this rubric in place, the zone of uncertainty may
broadly be renamed the state stewardship power, or further reduced to several smaller categories
once a sufficient body of case law exists to justify principled labels.
260

This model would, however, drop Epstein’s “force or fraud” requirement for the reasons
argued in section 6(ii)a supra.
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C. Concluding Comments on the Advantages and Utility of the Multi-Tiered Model.
The multi-tiered model proposed in this section was developed to address the specific
problems identified in the first six sections of this article. The proposed framework should prove
principled, flexible and, therefore, stable. However it is not a panacea for every takings problem
facing modern courts.
First and foremost, the proposed model is not a prescriptive test for takings—it is only a
framework. The use of heightened scrutiny for analyzing government actions falling within the
zone of uncertainty, or stewardship power, is intended to improve protections for private
property holders. However, its specific purpose is to require the government to provide a court
with clear reasons and data—instead of bare conclusions—so that the court can detect
government abuse. Once a court possesses these data, it still must exercise its own judgment to
resolve the compensation and validity issue. However, under the proposed model, the court will
be able to articulate the principles that motivated its decision within a framework clear enough to
enable litigants and scholars to understand its meaning and to propound coherent criticisms. This
removes the problem of circular logic such as “it is legal because it is lawful (an exercise of the
police power)” that precludes analysis and criticism of the Supreme Court’s current model.
The second important attribute of this model is that it balances the interests of private
property owners and the government in a more meaningful way than a single-tiered model.
Epstein proposes applying intermediate level scrutiny to all government takings to enhance the
protections for property owners.261 This objective is laudable but the method is overkill. Where
the government can demonstrate that the taking is designed to abate a nuisance without
conferring an additional public benefit or that that the property actually will be used by the
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EPSTEIN, TAKINGS at 181
92

public, courts should be able to weigh the merits of taking without extensive discovery or
rigorous analysis. This is especially true of actual public uses, which can be decided by the
government simply averring that the property will be used by the public and briefly describing
the method of use.
Where a case falls under the stewardship power, intermediate scrutiny provides a
valuable safeguard. The government would be required to present evidence that its condemnation
plan is designed to achieve a public benefit and that the taking is reasonably related to achieving
that public benefit. The court need not place itself in the uncomfortable position of weighing the
importance of a benefit to the public. Rather, this scrutiny would focus on determining that some
benefit would result from the plan and the condemned property is related to the plan. Here,
again, the framework proves flexible because courts may adjust the quantum of proof of a benefit
that they require from the government or the degree to which the property must be related to that
benefit.262 This enables the framework to accommodate a conservative approach—where the
government would bear a significant burden of proof, a liberal approach—where the government
could pass the test with minimal discovery and argument, or anything in between.
A third attribute of this framework is that it balances the interests of private property
owners and the public even outside of the courtroom. Some opponents of heightened scrutiny
argue that it will place too great a burden on the government and increase the cost of many
socially-useful projects.263 The multi-tiered model accounts for this on two separate levels.
First, where there is a clear public use or exercise of the police power, the government need not
262

This could range from the low threshold of “reasonably related” to the high standard of
“reasonably necessary” without harming the integrity of the analysis.
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John D. Echeverria, Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute’s “Top Ten”
Takings Issues. American Law Institute - American Bar Association Continuing Legal
Education: Annual Advanced ALI-ABA Course of Study, 2004. available on Westlaw at SJ086
ALI-ABA 297.
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go through the time and expense of satisfying a heightened level of scrutiny. Second, even where
heightened scrutiny is used, the burden on the government will not always be onerous. Where
the validity of the government’s purpose is readily discernable and the connection between the
action and the ultimate purpose is straightforward, intermediate-tiered scrutiny should not entail
extensive discovery or a lengthy trial. However, the more questionable the government’s
purpose is or the more tenuous the connection between the action and purpose are, the harder it
will be to satisfy this burden. Considering that an exercise of eminent domain can uproot one or
many families, it is not unreasonable to require the government to prove that it has a practical
and reasonably forward-thinking plan for using the properties to confer benefits.
A corollary of this principle is that if the government has invested the requisite amount of
thought and preparation prior to condemning the land, then intermediate level scrutiny will be
less onerous as the government already should possess much of the evidence necessary to prove
its case. Where the government has not been particularly diligent, the specter of intermediatetiered scrutiny provides a potent incentive to think twice before condemning property and
encourages negotiation with property owners.
The advantages of the proposed multi-tiered framework stand in stark contrast to the
faulty dichotomous analysis employed both by the court and its critics. A rigid analytic
framework that forces courts to choose between coherence and practicality under multiple
ideations and over several centuries should not be tweaked, restated, circumvented or amended;
it should be immediately and unequivocally rejected. The multi-tiered framework provides a far
superior alternative, capable of yielding consistently principled and practical judicial
determinations even as judicial attitudes towards takings changes. Accordingly, this article urges
the Supreme Court to abandon its faulty dichotomous takings analysis and adopt the multi-tiered
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model described herein. Only by doing this, can the Court give expression to the myriad legal
principles and normative values which define and drive takings jurisprudence.
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